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The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law:
A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?
Emily M.S. Houh*
I. INTRODUCTION

Does good faith matter anymore in American contract law? The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that "[e]very contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement."J The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by every state except
Louisiana, 2 defines good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,,,3 and it explicitly imposes a
good faith obligation on the performance and enforcement of every contract
falling within its scope. 4 Moreover, while the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-to which the United States is a
signatory--<ioes not directly impose a good faith obligation, it does state that,
"[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to ... the need to
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in
international trade.,,5
Yet, the question remains: if good faith does still matter, how does it
matter, and why should it continue to matter? What does compliance with the
"Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A., Brown
University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. I am thankful to the Harold C. Schott
Foundation at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, whose generous support made the
writing of this Article possible. I am also grateful to the following people for reading drafts of
this Article in various forms and for their insights and comments: Pat Chew, Teri Dobbins,
Adam Feibelman, Mike Jacobs, Hiroshi Motomura, Duncan Webb, Verna Williams, Ingrid
Brunk Wuerth, and Alfred Yen. Finally, I am especially indebted to Joel Frederic, Kevin
Hoskins, Jeanette McClellan, and Michelle Pan for their excellent research assistance. All errors
made in this Article are, of course, mine alone.
lRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371,379 (2003).
3U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (amended 2003).
4"Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance and enforcement." Id. § 1-304.
5United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, art. 7(1). Also, in England-the source of our American common law tradition-the good
faith obligation finally has begun to emerge as a viable and meaningful contract doctrine. See
Roger Brownsword et aI., Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context, in GoOD FAITH IN
CONTRACT: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT 1-2 (Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 1999) ("English law
takes a different approach [toward the doctrine of good faith], relying on a number of specific
doctrines aimed at securing fair dealing but eschewing any general principle of good faith in
contract .... During the last decade, however, the situation has been transformed, so much so
that, as the millennium approaches, the Lord Chief Justice has felt moved to declare that good
faith is the most important contractual issue of our time." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
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good faith obligation require of contracting parties, beyond compliance with
abstract notions of fairness?6 In their attempts to answer these questions,
commentators and scholars have generated scores of articles. 7 This Article
addresses both the positive question of what the good faith doctrine does
require and the normative question of what it should require. More specifically,
this Article attempts to assess and evaluate the ways in which courts are
currently employing the good faith doctrine in contract disputes as part of a
larger project. This project's goal is to reconceive and reinvigorate the private
law doctrine of good faith as one that might assist in effecting the public law
norm of equality.
I have argued elsewhere that the implied obligation of good faith should
be used to prohibit, in the contractual context, subordinating conduct based on
categories of identity such as race or, by analogy, subordinating conduct based
on gender, sexual identity, age, and other identity categories. 8 Additionally, I
have previously identified two leading approaches to the common law good
faith doctrine: Professor Robert Summers's "Restatement/excluder-analysis"
approach and Professor Steven Burton's "foregone opportunities" approach. In
short, Professor Burton's foregone opportunities approach is described and
justified as an economic analysis of good faith.9 Summers's
Restatement/excluder-analysis methodology, on the other hand, is described
and validated as a justice or fairness approach. 1O In 1981, the American Law
Institute adopted Summers's approach at section 205 of the Restatement and in
the text of its Official Comments to that section. 11
In an existing article, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive
Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law,12 I argue
6E . ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.16, at 486 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that courts
often look to basic principles of justice to determine fairness of exchange).
7See. e.g., Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 372 (1980) (proposing foregone opportunities approach to
good faith); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Frameworkfor Resolving the
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 586 (1996) (surveying different theoretical and judicial
approaches to good faith); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 816 (1982) [hereinafter Summers,
General Duty] (proposing excluder-analysis approach to good faith); Robert S. Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. REv. 195,196 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good Faith] (same).
8Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the
Implied Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025, 1088 (2003).
9I d. at 1034-35.
IOId. at 1035-38.
lISee RESTATEMENT § 205.
12 Houh, supra note 8. Critical Interventions uses the theoretical screens of law and market
economy theory and critical race theory to effect its critique, and to call for a theory of good
faith that more substantively reflects and enables practices that promote communitarian notions
of substantive and anti subordination theories of equality. See id. at pts. II, III, III.A.2
respectively, for further discussion of law and market economy theory, critical race theory, and
conceptions of equality. Using those theoretical lenses, Critical Interventions analyzes
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that although Summers's excluder-analysis approach explicitly concerns itself
with fairness, justice, and community standards, it has been and continues to be
employed positively and normatively by the courts to conform the conduct of
contracting parties to an economically ideal, efficient contracting world. 13 This
Article extends that descriptive critique on a more doctrinally focused level. It
argues that, to the extent that courts have applied and/or referenced the
foregone opportunities and excluder-analysis models of good faith in decisions
adjudicating contractual breach of good faith claims, they have rendered the
two approaches operationally and functionally indistinguishable by employing
both approaches as analytical proxies for material breach. Moreover, section
205 of the Restatement explicitly takes the position that it, "like the Uniform
Commercial Code ... , does not deal with good faith in the formation of a
contract.,,14 Thus, the common law obligation of good faith fails to reach the
most troubling forms of contractual bad faith: those that occur during contract

employment at-will cases in which plaintiffs sued their former employers and asserted not only
violations of federal and/or state antidiscrimination statutes, but also common law claims for
contractual-as opposed to tortious-breach of the duty of good faith. With regard to the
contractual cases, some courts disallowed the common law breach of good faith claims, asserting
that the availability of antidiscrimination remedies precluded such claims. Other courts allowed
such common law claims to proceed, either concurrently with, or in lieu of, the federal and/or
state civil rights claims. Id. at 1066-89.
More specifically, Critical Interventions argues that allowing plaintiffs to bring common
law good faith claims is important and necessary because civil rights statutes-including
amended section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits racial discrimination in
contract formation, performance, and termination-with their emphasis on and obsession with
the intentionality of the alleged perpetrators of discrimination, do not afford plaintiffs remedies
for the pervasive and "unconscious" forms of discrimination that they still suffer from on a dayto-day basis. Id. at 1086-88; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318, 322-23 (1987)
(critiquing Supreme Court's articulation in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239-41 (1976),
of dichotomy between intentional, unconstitutional discrimination and unintentional,
constitutional discrimination as false one and introducing theory of "unconscious racism").
13Houh, supra note 8, at 1042-49. In that regard, the excluder-analysis approach does
indirectly and subtextually what the foregone opportunities approach does directly and
explicitly: both are overly driven by traditional economic efficiency concerns. As such, it might
also be argued that economically efficient outcomes may also be just and fair ones. That position
has been argued persuasively and in numerous and varied contexts, and remains at the center of
lively scholarly debate. However, it is not an argument with which this Article is particularly
concerned. Economic efficiency is not necessarily inconsistent with justice or fairness. For
example, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed have refuted famously the notion that
justice concerns are merely residual in the economic analyses of the law and have argued that
"many entitlements that properly are described as based on justice in our society can easily be
explained in terms either of broad distributional preferences like equality or of efficiency or of
both." Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1105 (1972); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.13, at 132-33 (6th ed. 2003) (providing
economic justification of quasi-contractual restitutionary recovery for benefits conferred to
preserve life, health, or property).
14RESTATEMENT § 205 cmt. c.
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negotiation and fonnation. 15 Although the Restatement drafters have stated that
such egregious conduct is sanctionable under the contract doctrines of, for
example, incapacity, fraud, and duress,16 this Article argues that certain fonns
of bad faith conduct are not captured by those kinds of contract defenses.
Therefore, in order to reconcile good faith with its equitable roots, the good
faith obligation should apply to contract fonnation and negotiation.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part II explains the good faith
doctrine and explores in some depth the theoretical differences between the
Summers/excluder-analysis and Burton/foregone-opportunities approaches to
good faith. By demonstrating how courts have employed the two leading
approaches as rhetorical frameworks for analyzing underlyinp: breach of
contract claims and the doctrine of material breach, Part III argues that breach
of good faith claims have transfonned into stand-ins for underlying breach of
contract claims in contemporary decisions. It does this by examining
contractual good faith cases in the general contexts of presumptively ann'slength and non-ann's-length (that is, power-imbalanced) commercial contracts.
Specifically, in the category of ann's-length commercial cases, Part lILA
examines exemplary cases in the contexts of what I call "vanilla" commercial
contracting, commercial lending, contractor cases, and commercial real estate
leasing. Part m.B examines exemplary cases involving less equal bargaining
power in the contexts of franchisor/franchisee and dealer/distributor cases, lost
commissions cases, at-will employment, and consumer contracting. Part III
demonstrates that courts, by applying different models of good faith analyses,
are not primarily motivated by the articulated theory behind those models.
Rather, courts use good faith rhetoric-whatever its source-to supplement
and refine arguments relating to the basic underlying breach of contract claims.
Thus, good faith doctrine remains, substantively, a nearly empty vessel whose
condition is attributable in part to the limitations inherent in the leading
theories that aim to give the doctrine life.
In conclusion, Part IV proposes that the good faith doctrine might be
given new life in two different ways: first, vis-a-vis its applicability to bad
faith conduct in contract fonnation and negotiation-certainly not a new idea,

15See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817, 827-28 (1991) (explaining results of empirical study that
revealed, in context of negotiating for purchase of automobiles in greater Chicago land area, that
white males obtain significantly better deals than African Americans and women); Ian Ayres,
Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94
MICH. L. REv. 109, 109-10 (1995) (same-follow-up to Fair Driving); Ian Ayres & Gregory
Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 507, 508-09 (focusing on
promissory fraud liability in noncontractual settings, such as settings where parties enter into
option contract and one party does not intend from outset to exercise option).
\6See RESTATEMENT § 205 cmt. c ("Bad faith in negotiation, although not within the scope
of this Section, may be subject to sanctions. Particular forms of bad faith in bargaining are the
subjects of rules as to capacity to contract, mutual assent and consideration and of rules as to
invalidating causes such as fraud and duress.").
HeinOnline -- 2005 Utah L. Rev. 4 2005
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but one worth serious reconsideration; and second, with respect to performance
and termination, vis-a-vis its applicability in the employment context.
II. LEADING MODELS OF THE IMPLIED OBLIGAnON OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING

Contracts scholars have engaged the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing in a number of ways, using a number of different analytical and
theoretical approaches. For example, Professor Robert Summers-whose
conception of good faith was ultimately adopted by the American Law Institute
at section 205 of the Restatement-has argued for an open-ended approach to
good faith.17 This approach can be described most usefully through the
exclusion of contextually recognizable forms of bad faith conduct. 18 Professor
Steven Burton, on the other hand, has argued for an essentially economic
approach to the doctrine of good faith, whereby a party breaches good faith
when she has abused discretion contractually reserved to her by attempting to
recapture opportunities that she gave up during contract formation. 19 These two
models-at least in cases involving alleged common law breaches of
contractual good faith-are the leading approaches to the doctrine, and both
Summers and Burton are often cited by courts deciding contractual good faith
disputes. 2o

A. The Summers/Restatement Approach: Excluder-Analysis
In 1968, Professor Summers, in an article that has since become one of
the most influential in modem contract law, introduced his conceptualization
of the contractual obligation of good faith as an "excluder;" that is, as a
concept "without general meaning (or meanings) of its own, and serv[ing] to
exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.,,21 Central to
Summers's theory of good faith is the notion that it is defined as the negative

17Summers, General Duty, supra note 7, at 818-21; see also infra Part ILA (discussing
Summers/Restatement approach to good faith).
18 See infra Part ILA.
19Burton, supra note 7, at 373; see also infra Part II.B (discussing Burton's "foregone
opportunities" approach to good faith).
20Compare Stone Motor Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 293 F.3d 456, 466 (8th CiT. 2002)
(citing Summers's approach as adopted in Restatement), Cadle Co. v. Vargas, 771 N.E.2d 179,
183 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (same), Mo. Conso\. Health Care Plan v. Cmty. Health Plan, 81
S.W.3d 34, 45 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (same), and State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 651
N.W.2d 345, 353 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (same), with Mickle v. Christie's, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d
237,249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Burton's approach), Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 99
F. Supp. 2d 307,323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same), Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of America, Inc.,
47 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (same), and Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d
1121,1127 (N.J. 2001) (same).
21Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 201.
HeinOnline -- 2005 Utah L. Rev. 5 2005
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corollary of bad faith.22 As such, good faith perfonnance, according to
Summers, cannot be reduced to a definable and specific set of appropriate and
acceptable behaviors; rather, its substance derives from "rul[ing] out radically
heterogeneous fonns of bad faith. ,,23
Although he does not accede in his 1968 article to anticipated critiques
that his excluder-analysis is too boundless to be of any practical use, Summers
does recognize the need for an articulation of good faith that might be more
immediately applicable to a given set of facts. 24 As such, Summers catalogs
various recurring but "heterogeneous" fonns of bad faith conduct that he culled
from an expansive review of then-existing good faith cases. 25 In creating this
catalog, Summers is careful to point out that his list is exemplary and not
exhaustive. 26
In defining the scope of the good faith obligation, Summers frames his
analysis first by delineating four broad categories of bad faith: "Bad Faith in
the Negotiation and Fonnation of Contracts,,,27 "Bad Faith in Perfonnance,,,28
"Bad Faith in Raising and Resolving Contract Disputes,,,29 and "Bad Faith in
Taking Remedial Action.,,30 In part because the drafters of the Restatement
chose not to imply good faith obligations into the negotiation and fonnation of
contracts,31 subsequent common law developments in good faith jurisprudence
have focused almost exclusively on the second of Summers's categories, "Bad
Faith in Perfonnance," and in particular, on the subcategories of such
perfonnance. The subcategories of bad faith in perfonnance further delineated
by Summers include "Evasion of the Spirit of the Deal," "Lack of Diligence
and Slacking Off," "Willfully Rendering Only 'Substantial Perfonnance,'"
"Abuse of Power to Detennine Compliance," and "Interfering With or Failing
to Cooperate in the Other Party's Perfonnance.,,32 All of these subcategories
contemplate cases in which judges would feel comfortable using their
discretionary and equitable powers to find a breach of good faith where the
express language of the contract might not otherwise support a claim for
breach of contract. 33
Significantly, in his 1968 article as well as in a 1982 follow-up, Summers
is adamant about characterizing his conceptualization of good faith not as a
22ld.
23ld.
24ld.
25ld.
26ld.

at 200-01.
at 204.
at 202.
at 203.

at 220-32.
at 232-43.
29ld. at 243-48.
30ld. at 248-52.
31 See RESTATEMENT cmt. c ("This Section . . . does not deal with good faith in the
formation of a contract. Bad faith in negotiation, although not within the scope of this Section,
may be subject to sanctions.").
32Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 234-43.
27ld.

28ld.

33ld.
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rule, but "more in the nature of a principle or maxim,,34 that cannot be reduced
to a "vacuous general definition.,,35 Summers, like many of his
contemporaries,36 views the preference for a rigid, rule-based legal system as
not only undesirable but also "not in accord with relevant reality.,,37 Summers
further explains:
In point of fact, our law recognizes many kinds of non-rules as law.
Why not similarly recognize the principle requiring contractual good
faith? Furthermore, if we are to have doctrines which, among other
things, perform safety valve functions, then isn't it inevitable that
they will take rather general form? Of course, in their specific
applications, they will generate rules. 38
So, argues Summers, open-ended equitable doctrines such as good faithin addition to related doctrines such as implied promise, custom and usage,
fraud, negligence, and estoppel-operate as important supplements to existing
legal ruleS. 39 These doctrines function not only as independent bases for
liability, but perhaps even more importantly to "limit and quantify specific
legal rules and contract terms.'040 As such, the functions performed by these
supplemental doctrines "further the most fundamental policy objectives of any
legal system.,,41 Additionally, according to Summers, the good faith doctrine
embodies the potential of the common law system; "[b]y invoking good faith .
. . it may be possible for a judge to do justice and do it according to law."42

34Summers, General Duty, supra note 7, at 821.
35Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 206,264--65.
36See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1685, 1740-53, 1762-66, 1776 (1976) (arguing, in relevant part, that economic
principles embedded in legal rules and standards are "instrumental to [and not independent of]
the pursuit of substantive objectives"); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
123-30 (1977) (arguing same principle in regards to "political objectives").
37Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 265.
38ld.
39ld. at 198.
4old. (emphasis added).
4 lId.
421d. Summers's excluder approach to the doctrine of good faith ultimately found its way
into the Restatement at section 205. The section's official comments state:
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies
somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct
characterized as involving "bad faith" because they violate community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness .

. . . [A] complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the
following types are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions:
evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful
HeinOnline -- 2005 Utah L. Rev. 7 2005

8

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005: 1

The 1982 adoption of Summers's open-ended and contextual excluderanalysis approach to good faith by the American Law Institute signifies a
triumph of legal realism in modem contract law. 43 Since the publication of the
Restatement in 1981, a vast number of courts have come to rely on the implied
obligation of good faith as a sort of "'safety valve' to which judges may tum to
fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules of
law and specific contract language.,,44
B. The Burton/Economic Approach: Foregone Opportunities

The "foregone opportunities" approach to good faith, first theorized by
Professor Burton, focuses exclusively on Summers's second general category
of bad faith: "bad faith in performance.,,45 Burton's approach has been
important in the development of the good faith doctrine because it theorizes an
explicit economic analysis of the principle of good faith.46 Burton begins with
an economic cost analysis of contractual breach. 47 Based on this analysis,
Burton concludes that, from an economic perspective, bad faith breach is
analytically similar to simple breach by failure to perform an express
promise. 48 Both forms of breach involve a party's attempt to recapture
opportunities-in the form of resources committed at the time of contracting to
particular uses in the future-foregone in the contracting process. 49 Further,
one of Burton's basic premises is that, because contracts often involve an
uneven distribution of "discretion in performance" among the contracting
rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power to specify terms, and
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.
RESTATEMENT § 205 cmts. a, d; see also Summers, General Duty, supra note 7, at 821-37
(articulating same concepts).
43In the 1920s and 1930s, legal realists criticized the classical rule of law and its
application as overly formalistic and as a legal system that, in reality, was driven by policy,
economics, and politics cloaked in the myths of neutrality and objectivity. The realists
sometimes manifested this critique in the form of "rule skepticism," which recognized that legal
rules are "not what they appear to be." MARK TEBBIT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
29-30 (2000). In more concrete terms, the realists argued that the formalistic notion of the rule
of law created an illusion of certainty that masked the unspoken social and political assumptions
guiding much of judicial decision making. Id. at 30.
Karl Llewellyn, among the most important and well-known of the realists and chief
architect of the Uniform Commercial Code, argued that commercial law developed into its
modem, stabilized state not because it embodied and formalistically operationalized a set of
legal rules, but because particularized social and economic circumstances compelled the judicial
creation of a body of law that developed into a coherent doctrine. Note, 'Round and 'Round the
Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1669,
1671-73 (1982).
44Summers, General Duty, supra note 7, at 812.
45Burton, supra note 7, at 373.
46See id. at 372.
47I d. at 373.
48I d. at 373-78.
49 Id.
HeinOnline -- 2005 Utah L. Rev. 8 2005

No.1]

GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT LAW

9

parties, a "weaker" party might require some protection against the "stronger"
party's assigned discretion. 50 The duty of good faith performance supplies this
protection, and, therefore, its application in a given set of circumstances
determines legitimacy of the exercise of that discretion. 51
Burton's analysis also criticizes what he terms the "reasonable
contemplation" method of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of
discretion. 52 According to this approach, the duty of good faith performance
permits parties to exercise their discretion "for any purpose . . . reasonably
within the contemplation of the parties.,,53 Therefore, under the reasonable
contemplation approach, bad faith conduct includes any exercise of discretion
beyond the range of the parties' reasonable contemplation. 54 Burton criticizes
this approach as too reliant on "an amorphous totality of the circumstances at
the time of formation," and disapproves of the open-ended and far-reaching
factual inquiry it may require to discern "the parties' intentions and reasonable
expectations. ,,55
Burton thus formulates his foregone opportunities approach so as to
"make[] it possible to identify with greater particularity the relevant
expectations and motives that have been held to constitute bad faith.,,56 The
foregone opportunities approach assumes that during the contract formation
process, contracting parties forego opportunities to enter into other
agreements. 57 Burton describes bad faith conduct as the exercise of contractual
discretion on the part of one party in an attempt to "recapture" those
opportunities foregone during contract formation, because parties to the
resulting contract should have known that the contract precluded the
subsequent recapture of those opportunities. 58 He argues that application of this
foregone opportunities approach is desirable because it enables courts to
employ a less amorphous and more factually particularized inquiry in their
assessment of whether a party has breached the implied obligation of good
faith in any given case. 59
C. Summers-Burton: Divergence and Convergence

Generally, Burton's introduction of the foregone opportunities model of
good faith has been well-received. 60 However, Summers has expressed
50I d.

51Id.
52Id.
53Id.
54Id.
55!d.

at 380-84.
at 382-85.
at 387.
at 385-86.
at 386.
at 387.

56/d.

57Id. at 388.
58!d. at 388-89.
59!d. at 390-92.
60See cases cited supra note 20.
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reservations about Burton's attempt to craft a more defined and economicallybased approach to good faith. In particular, Summers argues that good faith
should not and cannot be defined in or justified by economic terms; he
promotes the more open-ended excluder-analysis as the better approach to
good faith. 61 On a theoretical level, Summers objects to the positive economic
impulse-as prevalent now as then-that compels the rationalization of legal
rules and doctrines as being economically efficient. 62 More precisely, Summers
critiques Burton's traditional economic analysis of good faith and the
assumptions of rationality underlying it:
[Burton's] claimed economic rational requires several responses.
First, it is ahistoric. As already indicated, the historical evidence
favors other rationales. Second, these other rationales, at least so far
as good-faith performance is concerned, are largely moral and
include the principle pacta sunt servanda ("the obligation to keep
agreements") .... Third, it is in any case rather speculative that the
rationale is economic--even in regard to a duty of good-faith
performance .... Fourth, it is one function of rationales to generate,
in light of facts and law, specific reasons for the decisions of
particular cases. The extent to which an economic rationale such as
the one proffered can do this efficiently and otherwise satisfactorily
is, as yet, undemonstrated and problematic ....63
Thus, Summers suggests that economic analysis should not playa major role in
the further development and application of the good faith doctrine and that
attempts to justify the doctrine as an amoral one-at least as it relates to
contract performance-are misguided. Rather, Summers argues, good faith has
everything to do with morality insofar as morality has something to do with the
effectuation of '''justice and justice according to law.",64
Summers's explicit and consistent attempts to incorporate justice-oriented
norms into contract law vis-a-vis the good faith doctrine are admirable andmore than twenty years later-refreshing given the dominance of economic
analyses in contemporary legal scholarship.65 Unfortunately, and somewhat
regrettably, this Article argues that despite the American Law Institute's
adoption of the rhetoric of justice and "community standards of decency ...
[and] faimess,,,66 and despite the courts' use of such rhetoric, the excluderanalysis has been employed primarily to bring about and promote economic
efficiency. While this Article and the larger project of which it is a part do not
61Summers, General Duty, supra note 7, at 821, 827.
62 I d. at 825-27.
63I d. at 827.
64Id. at 826 (quoting Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 198).
65See infra at Part III; see also Houh, supra note 8, at 1038 ("Summers's call for the
primacy of justice should be meaningfully revived.").
66RESTATEMENT § 205.
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take the position that efficiency of transactional exchange should not be one
goal of contract law, it contends that in many cases, Summers's call for the
genuine consideration of justice norms in the contractual context should be
meaningfully revived.
The body of work that can be characterized as law and economics or
economic analysis of the law is far too abundant to describe here in any
depth. 67 For purposes of this Article, the relevant applications of conventional
law and economic analysis suggest that, in a perfect contracting environment,
judicial interventions would be necessary to invalidate contracts only in the
most egregious of circumstances. 68 For example, this would include cases
involving fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract. 69 According to this
view, judicial intervention would be inappropriate if the agreement were
merely unfair to one of the parties. As succinctly stated by Professor Robin
Paul Malloy, a law and economics scholar who has been critical of traditional
economic analyses of the law, "[t]he market does not care about ... fairness or
justice.... As long as there are no artificial barriers to success, no one should
be offended by the functioning of the market. ,,70 This view is inconsistent with
both the Restatement's goals of, and Summers's rationale for, good faith: both
aim to promote justice and ensure fairness in the contracting process. 71 Despite
such explicitly stated goals, this Article contends that normative applications of
the excluder-analysis/Restatement iteration of good faith have had their
greatest success not in promoting justice and community standards of decency,
but rather in their promotion and construction of economically ideal
contracting conditions.
For example, Summers catalogs several specific forms of bad faith
conduct and their good faith counterparts. 72 One form contemplates the seller
who acts in bad faith by concealing a defect in his product; the good faith
counterpart is the seller's full disclosure to the buyer of material facts
concerning the goods. 73 This translates easily into an essential characteristic of
the economically ideal contracting environment: that all contracting parties
have access to "full information about the nature and consequences of [their]
choices.,,74 Another example of bad faith conduct catalogued by Summers
involves the contractor who "openly abus[es] [his] bargaining power to coerce
an increase in the contract price" (i.e., coercive modification); the good faith
67For a summary and discussion of some basic principles of law and economics, as well as
"post-law and economics," see Houh, supra note 8, at 1038--41.
68See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 261---64, 275---77 (3d ed.
2000).
69I d. at 275-77.
7oRoBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE ApPROACH TO THEORY
AND PRACTICE 32 (1990).
71Summers, General Duty, supra note 7, at 826.
72Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 203.
73/d. (citing Stewart v. Wyo. Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383,388 (1888)).
74ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 235 (1988).
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analogue is "refraining from the abuse of such bargaining power.,,75 Similarly,
a party acts in bad faith when it hires a broker to enter into an agreement and
then prevents the other party from deriving the benefits of that agreement by
preventing the broker from "consummating the deal." The good faith
counterpart is to act "cooperatively.,,76 These excluder-analysis prohibitions
against abusive or uncooperative conduct primarily function to deter
contracting parties from behaving opportunistically toward one another which,
in turn, "obviate[s] costly self-protective measures.,,77 Because a perfect
contracting environment requires minimal transaction costs, these good faith
prohibitions further economic goals by preventing contracting parties from
incurring extraneous transaction costs that would arise after contract formation
(in the form of settlement and litigation costS).78 The excluder-analysis
certainly has the potential to effect justice in a broader, noneconomic sense,
but in its original iteration it was, and is, quite susceptible to almost
exclusively economically driven applications by the courts. In this regard,
Summers's argument-that the pursuit of justice provides a better rationale for
the good faith obligation than does economic efficiency-is significantly
weakened. 79
Summers's and Burton's ostensibly divergent approaches to good faith in
fact converge significantly in theoretical and practical ways. Moreover, both
approaches are concerned, normatively speaking, with how to correctly
75Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 203 (citing Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery
Co., 15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1891)).
76/d. (citing Cams v. Bassick, 175 N.Y.S. 670, 673 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919)).
77POSNER, supra note 13, § 4.1, at 95.
78COOTER & ULEN, supra note 74, at 236; MALLOY, supra note 70, at 34-38.
79The ongoing work of Professor Juliet Kostritsky, a noted contracts scholar, is particularly
illuminating in this regard. In a recent paper delivered at a symposium held at the University of
Wisconsin Law School on "Freedom From Contract," Kostritsky argued that legal intervention
in enforcing contracts is economically justified because it helps to enhance first best outcomes
between contracting parties in an economically imperfect world. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy
for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: What to Do When Parties Have Not
Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 323, 324-30. The
imperfections that make the world economically inefficient are structural in nature and are
comprised of the following: (l) uncertainties relating to externalities, adverse selection, and
moral hazard; (2) contracting parties' human tendencies toward opportunism; and (3) sunk costs
that are lost in the event of opportunistic behavior during the course of contract performance
(these sunk costs might also be referred to as reliance costs). /d. Kostritsky argues that, in light
of such structural impediments to efficiency, legal intervention required to deal with those
impediments is ultimately less costly than private strategies that parties might otherwise use. Id.
With respect to Kostritsky's "taxonomy" for analyzing the structural impediments to
efficiency, the question arose at the "Freedom From Contract" symposium: what is
"opportunism"? A lively discussion ensued. This Article responds that opportunism in the
context of economic inefficiency is simply bad faith conduct, not only as defined explicitly by
Burton, but also in the nature of the types of conduct catalogued by Summers. Consistent with
Kostritsky's argument that judicial intervention--even to the extent it might curb freedom of
contract-best serves the parties' joint instrumental goals, in many breach of contract cases,
such judicial intervention takes the form of the courts' upholding parties' good faith claims.
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redistribute existing resources among contracting parties through the
prohibition of various forms of advantage taking in the contracting process.
Substantively, their approaches diverge only to the extent that they define
"advantage taking" differently. Burton narrowly defines advantage taking as
opportunistic conduct on the part of one of the parties after contract formation,
whereas Summers more broadly defines advantage taking as not only postformation opportunistic conduct, but also as opportunistic conduct during the
phases of contract negotiation, formation, termination, and dispute resolution. 80
While this disagreement over the scope of good faith has significant practical
implications, it does nothing-from a critical perspective-to challenge the
fundamentally economic conceptualization of good faith, notwithstanding the
rhetoric of "justice." Moreover, this disagreement has had little impact on how
courts have applied the good faith doctrine in contract cases.
III. THEORY INTO DOCTRINE? THE NEARLY EMPTY VESSEL OF GOOD FAITH
Despite the articulated difference in their rationales and perhaps because
of their demonstrated congruence, both the excluder-analysis and foregone
opportunities approaches have greatly assisted courts, on a practical level, in
applying the notoriously abstract notion of good faith to hard facts. But does
contractual good faith doctrine, as it has developed thus far, actualize the
articulated normative aspects of the leading models? This Article argues that
the long-standing scholarly debates about good faith, discussed above, have
not in fact resulted in a doctrine that embodies the theoretical and normative
dichotomy between the two leading approaches. In fact, in looking at how
courts have employed good faith analyses in breach of contract cases, it
appears that the scholarly debate over what good faith should require has
mattered very little to the courts, even to those courts that have relied explicitly
on either the excluder-analysis approach or the foregone opportunities
approach (or, in some cases, both) for their articulation of an applicable good
faith standard.
Moreover, to the extent courts have taken breach of good faith claims
seriously by discussing them at all, this Part argues that they have done so
merely to bolster rhetorically their analyses of the underlying breach of
contract claims. To be clear, this Part does not argue that courts are necessarily
misunderstanding or misapplying the good faith doctrine. In fact, the good
faith models provide extremely useful rhetorical tools that have been employed
by the courts to deepen their breach of contract analyses. In that respect, good
faith jurisprudence, as it has developed thus far, has done quite a lot to develop
the economic analysis of contract law. This Part further contends that courts
may be limited in how they effect good faith analyses, in part because of the
limitations of the leading theories discussed in Part II of this Article. Thus, this
Part's descriptive argument critiques the good faith obligation, both as it has
80 Summers,

Good Faith, supra note 7, at 220-62.
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been conceived by scholars and applied by courts, as having almost no
identifiable value as an independent contract obligation. Rather, good faith is
an empty vessel which functions rhetorically and analytically as a proxy for
simple breach of contract and has not been used by the courts to actuate the
theory or policy underlying it.
At the outset, all of the cases analyzed in this Part involve only
contractual claims for breach of good faith. The cases are first grouped under
two general subheadings: presumably arm's-length contracting cases involving
parties that have equal bargaining power, and cases involving presumably
unequal bargaining power. Under each of these general groupings, the cases
are further subcategorized. What I refer to as "vanilla" commercial contracting
cases-commercial lender and foreclosure cases, commercial contractor cases,
and commercial real estate and development cases-fall under the former
general heading; franchisor/franchisee and dealer/distributor cases, lost
commissions cases, employment cases involving termination of at-will
employees, and consumer contract cases fall under the latter.
Analysis of these cases shows that, notwithstanding the principles of
justice and fairness that theoretically justify the Restatement/excluder-analysis
approach, good faith analysis is used consistently to effect economic outcomes
and norms and as a proxy and rhetorical framework for breach of contract
analyses. What is particularly significant about this descriptive claim is that it
applies not only to the obvious arm's-length commercial contracting cases, but
also to cases involving presumably unequal bargaining power-cases which,
one might assume, may lend themselves best to analyses adopting the fairness
approach to good faith. This may be due in part to the obvious (at least to some
of us) reality that all transactions are to some extent both commercial (read,
economic) and, for lack of better words, human and personal. But even if this
were the case, why do good faith analyses across categories of cases defer so
easily to purely economic analyses, even in the face of the Restatement's
explicit justice-oriented rationale?
A. Arm's-Length Commercial Cases
I. "Vanilla" Commercial Contracting Cases
John B. Conomos, Inc. v. Sun CO.,Sl a Pennsylvania case decided in 2003,
exemplifies the sort of breach of good faith claims in the commercial context
that I refer to as "vanilla" commercial contracting cases. Conomos involved a
contract for the painting of industrial piping at a Pennsylvania refinery owned
by defendant Sun Company. S2 As is typical of the commercial bidding process,
the bid specifications issued to interested painters by Sun Company included

81S31 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
821d. at 700.
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quality control requirements that conformed to industry-wide standards. 83
Conomos won the bid. 84 However, by the second or third day of work, it began
to experience conflict with Sun Company's inspector, Don Desroches. 85
Desroches, according to Conomos, imposed overly burdensome inspection
standards that exceeded both industry and contractually required standards. 86
Notwithstanding these objections, Conomos complied with Desroches's
requirements and consequently incurred additional expenses. 87 Conomos
repeatedly requested in writing an increase to the contract price as
compensation for these additional expenses, which eventually led Sun
Company to cancel the contract. 88 Since Sun Company refused to pay
Conomos the additional expenses, Conomos sued Sun Company, in part for the
additional charges. 89
The trial court held that Sun Company had breached the contract in bad
faith and ultimately awarded Conomos contractual damages in an amount
reflecting both the additional expenses incurred by Conomos and its lost
profit. 90 The appellate court engaged in an unusually thorough examination of
the doctrine of contractual good faith. First and foremost, it accepted section
205 of the Restatement and found that, in Pennsylvania, the "duty of good faith
performance [is imposed] on each party in general commercial contracts.,,91
The court went on to describe Pennsylvania's closely related common law
doctrine of "necessary implication," which states: "[i]n the absence of an
express term, the doctrine of necessary implication may act to imply a
requirement necessitated by reason and justice without which the intent of the
parties is frustrated.',92 The court linked the doctrine of necessary implication
to that of good faith, stating that neither doctrine could be used to argue that
terms merely implied by the contract would trump the contract's express
provisions. 93 Such a restriction, the court explained, conformed to general
contractual principles that privilege unequivocal and express contract terms
83/d.
84/d.

at 701 n.l.
at 701.

85ld.
86ld.
87ld.
88/d.

89ld. at 701-02. In the meantime, Sun Company had hired another company to replace
Conomos and complete the job. Significantly, the new painter likewise experienced problems
with Desroches relating to his excessive inspection standards. The problems eventually led to the
hiring of a mediator to resolve the dispute between the replacement and Sun Company, which
ultimately was resolved against Sun Company. Id. at 702.
90ld. at 702. The trial court also found that Sun Company violated Pennsylvania's
Contractor Payment Act and, as such, assessed approximately $30,750 in penalties and
attorney's fees against it. ld. at 702-03. As a result of posttrial motions, this figure was increased
further. Id.
91ld. at 705-06 (citing Donahue v. Fed. Express Corp., 753 A.2d 238,242 CPa. Super. Ct.
2000)).
92I d. (citing Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
93 Id. (citing Kaplan v. Cablevision ofPa., Inc., 671 A.2d 716,720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
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over inconsistent default rules or gap-fillers. 94 The court further explained that
the doctrine's content and its articulated parameters enabled courts "to
hannonize the reasonable expectations of the parties with the intent of the
contractors and the tenns in their contract.,,95
The Conomos court's examination of the doctrines of necessary
implication and good faith is illuminating in several respects, and provides a
useful framework for how to think about and apply the implied duty of good
faith. First, of course, the court cited section 205 of the Restatement and said
the duty of good faith was an implied provision of the contract. Second, the
language used to articulate the doctrine of necessary implication echoes that of
the Official Comments to section 205-and, consequently, of Summers's
conceptualization of good faith-in that it imposes obligations on the
contracting parties that are "necessitated by reason and justice" and "without
which the intent of the parties ... [would be] frustrated.,,96 Third, this same
language emphasizes that the duty of good faith is to be applied in order to
effect the intent of the parties at the time of contract fonnation. Fourth, in
discussing at length the idea that the implied duty of good faith may not in any
circumstances be used to effect an end-run around the unequivocal and express
tenns of the contract, the court made clear that the implied duty of good faith
is, at its core, a default standard that governs the perfonnance of contracts
generally. As a default standard, the court further stated that '''this obligation
of good faith is tied specifically to and is not separate from the [express] duties
a contract imposes on the parties. ",97
In tenns of what constitutes good faith's content, the court again stated
that good faith conduct is that which will best effect the intent of the parties. It
also employed the rhetoric of "reasonable expectations": "[b ]oth the implied
covenant of good faith and the doctrine of necessary implication are principles
for courts to harmonize the reasonable expectations of the parties with the
intent of the contractors and the terms of their contract. ,,98 This language is
derivative of then-Judge Cardozo's opinion in the famous case, Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon,99 which is widely read as one of the earliest American
cases to imply a duty of "best" or "reasonable" efforts. Of the contract at issue
in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, the court stated:
The agreement . . . has a wealth of recitals. The defendant
insists, however, that it lacks the elements of a contract. She says that
the plaintiff does not bind himself to anything. It is true that he does
not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts to
94Id.
95I d. at 707.
96Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
97I d. at 706--07 (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy
Ghost, 777 A.2d 418,434 n.11 (Pa. 2001)).
98Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
99 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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place the defendant's indorsements and market her designs. We
think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied. The law
has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a
broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole
writing may be 'instinct with obligation,' imperfectly expressed. If
that is so, there is a contract.
The implication is that the plaintiff's business organization will
be used for the purpose for which it is adapted.... Unless [plaintiff]
gave his efforts, [defendant] could never get anything. Without an
implied promise, the transaction cannot have.such business 'efficacy,
as both parties must have intended that at all events it should
have.'lOo
The language of effecting the "intent of the parties" and their "reasonable
expectations" under the contract and of carrying forward the "purpose of the
contract" in such a way that it "does not contravene the express terms of the
contract" crops up again and again in common law good faith cases. IOI While
some courts vary the terms-for example, they might refer to the parties'
reasonable expectations as the reasonably expected "fruits" or "benefit of the
bargain"I02-the rhetoric used to describe the content of the common law
contractual duty of good faith remains largely consistent and is almost never
further developed in any meaningful way.I03 Moreover, where courts also have
referenced the common law good faith notions of "justice" (as the Conomos
court did), "fairness," and "community standards," they usually mean little
more than reasonable expectations under the contract. I04 At most, when courts
expand upon the common law rhetoric of good faith, they borrow from the
language and jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code which defines
good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing." 105
at 214-15 (citations omitted).
IOISee, e.g., James v. Whirlpool Corp., 806 F. Supp. 835, 843 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (explaining
such concepts in good faith discussion); In re Enron Corp., 292 B.R. 752, 782-83 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d
1359,1363 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (same).
102See, e.g., Healy v. Carlson Travel Network Assocs., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1090
(D. Minn. 2002) (explaining good faith in such terms); Piantes v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 875 F.
Supp. 929, 938 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998)
(same).
I03See infra Part IILC.
I04See infra Part IILe.
I05U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (amended 2003). "Every contract or duty within [the Uniform
Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement." Id.
§ 1-304 (alteration in original). Moreover, the implied obligation of good faith may not be
disclaimed in U.C.C.-governed contracts. Id. § l-302(b) ("The obligations of good faith,
IOOId.
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While the American common law doctrine of good faith originated as a
matter of justice to convert potentially illusory contracts into valid and
enforceable ones-as exemplified in Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon-the Conomos
analysis exemplifies how it presently serves two primary purposes, often in
interrelated ways. First, it enables efficient exchange transactions by
minimizing otherwise prohibitive transaction costs at the negotiation phase of
contracting. That is, if parties were required at the contract formation stage to
negotiate every potential and discrete form of performance-related conduct that
might or might not be expected under the contract, they very well might not
bother entering into the contract in the first place. Thus, reasonable
expectations are implied as part of the duty of good faith in contract
performance in order to minimize negotiation-related transaction costs. 106
Moreover, from a relational perspective,107 the notion of having to explicitly
negotiate over each party's integrity in contract performance risks infusing the
relationship with the sort of distrust and bad feeling that could ultimately
destroy it. Thus, that each party will use its best efforts to actuate the purpose
of the contract and the intent of the parties is also assumed under the rubric of
good faith.
The second primary purpose served by the good faith doctrine is that it
provides a rhetorical framework for the analysis and adjudication of material
breach; thus it also teaches us something about the related doctrine of
constructive conditions.108 The Conomos court's application of the doctrines of

diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the Uniform Commercial Code] may not be
disclaimed by agreement. The parties, by agreement, may determine the standards by which the
performance of those obligations is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly
unreasonable." (alteration in original».
1061n other words, as a federal district court in Oregon put it:
If in each contract the parties had to expressly describe and prohibit every artifice by
which the parties could potentially deprive each other of the fruits of their
agreement, then contracts would soon become as long as the tax code, as difficult to
interpret, and (like the tax code) still contain innumerable loopholes available to a
party that wished to avoid the spirit of the bargain. The better approach ... is to treat
a contract for what it is-an exchange of solemn promises-and enforce the
objectively reasonable expectations of the parties.
Or. RSA No.6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Or. Ltd. P'ship, 840 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D. Or.
1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 76 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996).
I07 See Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L.
REv. 483, 525 (surveying behavioral, legal, and scholarly dimensions of relational contract law
and arguing that acquisition of "greater knowledge of ... essential human social patterns" is
required to fully understand discrete contractual exchanges).
1081n contract law, constructive conditions are those implied by a court, absent express
contract terms, so that it may determine the extent to which one party's duty to perform under a
contract is conditioned upon performance by the other party. The doctrine of constructive
conditions provides an analytical framework for courts in cases where one party claims it did not
yet have a duty to perform because of the other party's failure to render its performance. As
such, the doctrine of constructive conditions is directly related to that of substantial performance
(and also material breach). In short, in the absence of express terms, the substantial performance
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necessary implication and good faith demonstrates how the good faith doctrine
functions in this way. In describing the standard of conduct required of
Conomos under the contract, the court stated:
Sun's obligation to inspect Conomos's work-and, if deemed to
satisfy the requirements of the contract to approve the work and
render payment therefor-is necessary to Conomos's enjoyment of
the contract's benefits. The contract requires Conomos to perform a
specific level of work. As the trial court observed, a certain level of
subjectivity goes into evaluating the work. The contractual standarCl
for the required work, however, was specific enough to prescribe the
necessary procedures in relation to other levels of work along a
spectrum. . . . These objective guidelines created reasonable
expectations regarding the basis upon which Sun was to inspect the
work. Because the contract necessarily implies that Sun will not
defeat Conomos' s reasonable expectation that work of sufficient
quality will be compensated as agreed, the contract reflects that Sun
had an implied duty of good faith in the inspection oj Conomos's
surface preparation and painting.
The trial court found that Sun's foreman demanded a higher
level of work than the contract required. The court found that
because oj its "true motivation, " Sun did not inspect Conomos work
in good faith. 109
Although in this case Conomos sued Sun Company, the good faith
analysis is used here not only to determine whether Sun breached the contract
by inspecting the pipes in bad faith, but to determine whether Sun Company's
payment obligation under the contract was excused due to Conomos's failure
to satisfy a constructive condition of the contract-Conomos's own good faith
preparation of the pipes at a level that would satisfy the demanding
inspector. I 10
As in many cases involving satisfaction requirements, III whether express
or implied, application of the doctrine of good faith enabled the court to
determine, correctly, that Conomos had not failed to satisfy such a constructive
condition, because such a constructive condition in fact did not exist. Under
the express terms of the contract, Conomos was required to prepare the pipes
of a contract serves as a constructive condition of performance of the counter-party (usually
payment).
l09Conomos, 831 A.2d at 707 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
1IOld.
lllSee. e.g., Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413,415-17 (7th
Cir. 1983) (holding that while subjective standard of good faith applies when contract involves
personal aesthetics, such as painting portrait, when satisfaction clause is part of commercial
contract, objective standards might allow court to evaluate commercial quality or utility, and
commercial reasonableness standard is to be applied).
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to a commercially reasonable level. 112 Sun Company could not reasonably
expect that Conomos should perform at a higher level; if extra-high-quality
pipe preparation had been im!Jortant to Sun, it should have negotiated
expressly for such performance in the first place. Conomos's refusal to comply
with Desroches's excessive standards without further compensation by Sun
Company thus did not result in a breach of contract on Conomos's part, and
Sun Company could not legally suspend or discharge its payment obligations
to Conomos for the extra work that was not contemplated at the time of
contract formation. Moreover, even if compliance with Desroches's demands
could be characterized as a constructive condition, it appears that Conomos
substantially performed ll3 and would have been entitled to restitutionary
compensation in the modification amount it had requested.
In 2002, the Superior Court of New Jersey decided Seidenberg v. Summit
Bank,114 another example that may become a leading case on commercial
breach of good faith. Seidenberg provides a textbook review of good faith
doctrine and also illustrates how the treatment of good faith claims in the
context of arm's-length transactions between sophisticated parties differs from
the treatment of such claims in the context of transactions involving parties
with unequal bargaining power. I 15 The two plaintiffs in Seidenberg were sole
shareholders of Pennsylvania insurance brokerage companies; 116 they
eventually sold the stock in their companies to the defendant Summit Bank. 117
In consideration for the sale, the plaintiffs received a substantial number of
shares of stock in Summit's parent corporation and also retained their
executive positions in the after-acquired firms. 118 As part of the deal, the two
also negotiated to manage and run similar insurance brokerage firms to be
acquired by Summit, and to take a cut in their executive salaries in exchange
for bonus compensation based on the anticipated growth of the businesses. I 19
The relationship between the plaintiffs and Summit later deteriorated, however,
and the two plaintiffs were eventually fired. 120 Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs
filed a breach of good faith lawsuit, alleging that Summit had deprived them of
their reasonable expectations under the contracts by failing to develop both
potential customers and relationships with other entities that might have
resulted in the acquisition of additional insurance brokerage firms. 121
112Conomos, 831 A.2d at 701.
113Id.
114
791 A.2d 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
IISSee infra Part I1I.B.
116Seidenberg, 791 A.2d at 1072. In other words, plaintiffs' companies marketed and sold
health insurance benefits plans to employers. Id.
117Id.
118Id.
119Id. at 1072-73.
12oId. at 1073.
121Id. Specifically, Seidenberg and Raymond claimed that Summit failed to introduce them
to potential customers in the fonn of vendors with whom Summit did business, failed to give
them infonnation they needed in order to provide potential customers with advice concerning
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The plaintiffs also asserted a claim sounding in what has been referred to
as promissory fraud. 122 They alleged that "Summit 'never had any intention to
perform to begin with,' and that Summit 'from the start, ... never [was]
committed to developing the business with [plaintiffs], but rather simply
wanted to acquire the business and seek out their own broker to run it or grow
it. ",123 In other words, the plaintiffs alleged that Summit had contracted with
them simply to learn the insurance brokerage business and then to eliminate
them as competition, so that Summit could develop its own firms.
The lower court dismissed the good faith claims on parol evidence
grounds, noting that it was "not dealing with unsophisticated people.
[Plaintiffs] ... are very sophisticated businessmen.... And with the assistance
of very able counsel entered into certain contracts with the bank.... [They]
leaned back in reliance on things that were said to them during the course of
the negotiations .... ,,\24 The appellate court found that, in so holding, the
lower court had "represent[ed] an erroneous interpretation of the evolving
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.,,125 Consequently, it reversed
the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. 126
The court stated that the obligation of good faith is implied in all
contracts, and repeated the familiar doctrinal rhetoric: "'neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract. ",127 The court further provided
a concise overview of the significant ways in which the doctrine had been
used: to prevent opportunism and exploitation in situations involving a
plaintiffs "inadequate bargaining power" or other "financial vulnerability"; to
ensure that the parties' expectations were consistent with the contract's express
terms; and to thwart a defendant's bad faith or dishonesty.128 By emphasizing
the good faith doctrine's applicability to cases involving parties with unequal
bargaining power, the lower court misunderstood the nature of the good faith
claim. 129 Although leading good faith cases had considered disparate
bargaining power as a "critical aspect" and "prominent feature" of the good
faith doctrine's application and analysis, "it is not the sine qua non of such a
health and other employee benefits, "unreasonably delayed a direct mail campaign" to solicit
customers, "thwarted a joint marketing campaign," and "failed to advise" them about an attempt
to acquire "another entity which [they] claim[ed] would fall within their ambit and right to
operate." [d. at 1072-73.
122See generally Ayres & Klass, supra note 15, at 508-09 (focusing on promissory fraud
liability in noncontractual settings, such as settings where parties enter into option contract and
one party does not intend from outset to exercise option).
123Seidenberg, 791 A.2d at 1073 (quoting plaintiffs' complaint).
124Id. at 1074 (quoting trial court's ruling).
125Id.

at 1080.
at 1074 (quoting Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587 (N.J.
1997); Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 207 A.2d 522, 531 (N.J. 1965».
126Jd.
127Id.
128Id.
129Id.
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cause of action. It is merely one factor among many to be considered.,,13o Thus,
the appellate court held that claims for breaches of good faith may be
actionable, even as between equally sophisticated contracting parties. 131
Having clarified the good faith doctrine's general applicability to both
arm's-length and non-arm's-length transactions, the court then surveyed three
more specific ways in which the good faith doctrine has been applied. First, the
court stated that "the covenant permits the inclusion of terms and conditions
which have not been expressly set forth in the written contract. . . . The
covenant acts in ... instances to include terms 'the parties must have intended .
. . because they are necessary to give business efficacy' to the contract.,,132
Second, the court explained, the good faith covenant has been used "to allow
redress for the bad faith performance of an agreement even when the defendant
has not breached any express term.,,133 Finally, the court stated that the good
faith obligation has been used "to permit inquiry into a party's exercise of
discretion expressly granted by a contract's terms.,,134 In other words, with
respect to this third way in which the covenant has been applied, the court
described (and later cited to) Burton's foregone opportunities approach to good
faith.135 With respect to all of these categories of application, the court, citing
section 205 of the Restatement for support, set forth a "guiding principle" in its
application: "The guiding principle in the application of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing emanates from the fundamental notion that a
party to a contract may not unreasonably frustrate its purpose.,,136
In its attempt to follow this guiding principle, the court synthesized and
applied the three models of analysis just described. In reversing the lower
court's order of dismissal, the court first found that the plaintiffs had alleged an
expectation-notwithstanding Summit's express contractual right to terminate
the contract-that Summit could not terminate the agreement in bad faith.137
130!d. at 1075 (citing Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 253 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir.
2001»; see also Sons of Thunder, 690 A.2d at 588-90 (finding that despite presence of
termination clause, clam purchaser breached obligation of good faith in terminating contract
because of lack of honesty offact).
l3lSeidenberg, 791 A.2d at 1075.
mId. at 1076 (quoting N.J. Bank v. Palladino, 389 A.2d 454, 461 (N.J. 1978».

133Id.

134!d.
I35See id. at 1078 (citing Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp. 773 A.2d 1121, 1127 (N.J. 2001),
for support in formulating its discretionary approach to good faith). The Wilson court quoted
Burton, supra note 7, at 386, with approval. See Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1127.
136Seidenberg, 791 A.2d at 1077 (emphasis added).
!37!d. at 1078. This is consistent with one strain of at-will employment cases, as well. For
example,
[i]n Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital[, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)], the
Supreme Court of Arizona delineated three general categories of exceptions to the
rule that an employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason or no
reason: the public policy exception, the implied-in-fact employment contract
exception, and the good faith and fair dealing exception .... [T]he good faith and
fair dealing exception establishes a [contractual] duty imposed by law where the
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Second, the court found that, in failing to invest its time and energy into
developing potential customers and growing other firms to be managed and run
by the plaintiffs, Summit may have abused discretion reserved to it under the
contract in an opportunistic fashion. 138 That is, in refusing to exercise its
discretion to develop the insurance firms that would jointly benefit the
plaintiffs, Summit had attempted to improperly recapture an opportunity that it
had presumably given up by entering into the contract with the plaintiffs: the
opportunity to develop independently its own brokerage firm business(es)
exclusively for its own benefit.
The court then dedicated a significant amount of space to analyzing the
application of the good faith covenant to cases involving bad faith performance
and/or "ill motive" on the part of the allegedly breaching party.139 The court
correctly described this application of good faith as explicitly equitable in
nature, hence, dependent upon the court's careful discretionary employment of
the doctrine. 140 The court explained, for example, that judges are not to engage
in "overly ambitious" applications of good faith, thus, they should not use the
covenant to "supplant the prohibition on judicial rewriting of contracts or [to]
provide undue protection to contracting parties who can protect
themselves. ",141 Rather, the court stated, analyses in such cases should tum on
whether the defendant "'acted in bad faith or violated any commercially
reasonable standard thereby depriving plaintiffs of their right to make a
reasonable profit. ",142 Here, the court clearly was relying on U.C.c.
articulations of good faith standards and definitions. 143 As to parties acting in
"bad faith," the court analogized such bad faith to a party's abuse of discretion
under the contract, further clarifying that "'[w]ithout bad motive or intention,
discretionary decisions that happen to result in economic disadvantage to the
other party are of no legal significance. ",144 Here again, although it did not
specifically cite Burton, the court relied on the foregone opportunities
approach to the conceptualization of good faith.
Then, in a refreshing tum, the court proceeded to acknowledge that all of
the good faith rhetoric that it had been discussing "provide[s] little guidance"
to the court, which "'must distinguish bad faith from mere sharp commercial

contract itself is silent, which requires that neither party do anything that will injure
the right of the other to receive the benefits of their agreement.
Houh, supra note 8, at 1067-68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
138Seidenberg, 791 A.2d at 1078.
139Id. at 1078-80.
140/d. at 1079.
141/d.
142/d. (quoting Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, lUI (N.J. 2001)).
143The u.c.c. defines good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20), 2-103(l)(b) (amended 2003). The
New Jersey courts' reliance on the Uniform Commercial Code's articulation of good faith
definitions and standards is well placed.
144Seidenberg, 791 A.2d at 1079 (quoting Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1130).
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practice.',,145 Yet the court correctly insisted that trial courts and juries are in
the best position to make such judgments, because "[i]n the final analysis, bad
faith must be judged not only in light of the proofs regarding the defendant's
state of mind but also in the context from which the claim arose.,,146
In yet another refreshing turn, the court expressed its comfort with the
good faith doctrine's inherent vagueness: "Any attempt to provide greater
definition is to expect some 'delusive exactness' which, as Justice Holmes
said, is 'a source of fallacy throughout the law.",\47 The court's confidence in
judges and juries to make good faith determinations-while discomforting to
some-precisely reflects the nature of equitable doctrines and the intended
application of them.
In its lengthy discussion of good faith, the Seidenberg court succeeded
where most courts dealing with good faith have failed: it set forth a nuanced
and comprehensive treatment of the good faith doctrine. The Seidenberg
court's application of the good faith doctrine also demonstrates the functional
equivalence of Summers's and Burton's purportedly opposing
conceptualizations of good faith by demonstrating that Burton's model simply
describes a category of radically negative conduct prohibited by Summers's
excluder-analysis approach. 148 If good faith is what bad faith is not (in
Summers's words), then good faith is (in Burton's words) a contracting party's
refusal to abuse contractual discretion reserved to it in a way that would
deprive the counter-party of her reasonable expectations under the contract.
A close reading of the Seidenberg opinion supports this Article's claim
that good faith rhetoric and analyses, while equitable in nature, serve largely to
assist courts in determining whether there was a breach of the underlying
contract. In focusing on and synthesizing three distinct models of good faith
analysis--each of which ultimately aims to protect the reasonable expectations
of the parties-the court exemplified how the development of the good faith
doctrine has diverged from its Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon 149 roots and
14S Id. at 1079 (quoting Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 307,311
(D.N.J. 2000), rev'd, in part, on other grounds, 253 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2001)).
146Id.
147Id. at 1080 (quoting Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
148For example, Robert Summers lists the following forms of conduct as "radically
heterogeneous forms of bad faith":
I. seller concealing a defect in what he is selling[;] 2. builder willfully failing to
perform in full, though otherwise substantially performing[;] 3. contractor openly
abusing bargaining power to coerce an increase in the contract pricer;] 4. hiring a
broker and then deliberately preventing him from consummating the deal[;] 5.
conscious lack of diligence in mitigating the other party's damages[;] 6. arbitrarily
and capriciously exercising a power to terminate a contract[;] 7. adopting an
overreaching interpretation of contract language[; and] 8. harassing the other party
for repeated assurances ofperformance[.]
Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 203-04.
149 11 8 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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other equitably implied obligations, such as the implied obligation of
habitability.15o The Seidenberg court's treatment of good faith shows how the
covenant has come to be used "in aid and furtherance of other terms of the
agreement,,,151 rather than to imply separate, equity-based obligations into the
contract terms. Most contracts scholars would argue that this is precisely how
the doctrine should be understood and applied. This Article opposes this
current understanding and employment of the doctrine. It argues that this
understanding of good faith could just as easily be subsumed in the doctrinal
and theoretical rubric of material breach, leaving good faith open to other
readings and applications.
2. Commercial Lending Cases

Because of the nature of agreements between equally sophisticated
lenders and borrowers, courts dealing with breach of good faith claims in
commercial lending and foreclosure contexts tend to employ Burton's foregone
opportunities approach. 152 The agreements generally reserve to lenders a
certain amount of discretionary authority to, among other things, advance
and/or freeze credit lines or adjust interest rates. Such cases cannot always be
described as involving parties with unequal bargaining power; sophisticated
borrowers often successfully negotiate advantageous loan terms and
conditions. However, they do usually involve the lender's alleged opportunistic
abuse of contractually reserved discretion. 153
150This implied obligation, in stark contrast to the principal caveat emptor (let the buyer
beware), which applied presumptively when land was often more important than the structures
on it, protects lessees in rental contracts for residential and other properties. A majority of states
recognize this implied warranty, compelling landlords to comply with building codes, make
repairs, and generally provide fit living conditions.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ... provides consumers with a set of
warranties applying to transactions in goods. Subsequent[ly] ... federal and state
legislatures enacted legislation to further protect consumers. However, these laws
excluded consumers of housing-residential tenants. To lessen this disparity, courts
and legislatures created an implied warranty of habitability to govern housing
conditions.
Barbara Jo Smith, Note, Tenants in Search of Parity with Consumers: Creating a Reasonable
Expectations Warranty, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 475, 475 (1994) (citations omitted). Moreover, in
1972, the American Law Institute adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7B
U.L.A. 527 (2000), which incorporates the common law warranty of habitability and specifically
defines the related duties owed by landlords to their tenants.
151Ripplemeyer v. Nat'l Grape Coop. Ass'n, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1439, 1452 (W.D. Ark.
1992).
IS2See, e.g., MIA-COM Sec. Corp. v. Galesi, 904 F.2d 134,136 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that
courts employ good faith doctrine to protect parties' expectations); Tufankjian v. Rockland Trust
Co., 782 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that jury was reasonable to conclude that
bank sought to recapture foregone opportunities and secure better deal in violation of duty of
good faith and fair dealing).
153See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38
P.3d 12, 17, 20, 31, 37 (Ariz. 2002) (allowing claim to proceed where interim lender for
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Southwest Savings and Loan Ass 'n v. SunAmp Systems, Inc. 154 is an
exemplary case. There, SunAmp, a small manufacturing company, executed a
loan agreement and revolving credit note with Southwest Savings and Loan for
the purpose of expanding its business operations. 155 Southwest required
personal guarantees from SunAmp's investors before it would extend the
loans; SunAmp's president, director, and its major investor subsequently
provided the guarantees. 156 As a matter of policy, Southwest did not accept
loan guarantees without spouses' signatures. 157 However, the terms of
SunAmp's loan agreement and guarantees did not expressly require spouses'
signatures, and the major investor's spouse never signed the guarantees. 15S
Under the terms of the loan agreement, and in accord with commercial
loans of this nature, Southwest acquired a security interest in SunAmp's assets
as collateral to secure the credit line. 159 The agreement also provided for the
advancement of funds and credit, the amounts of which were based on the
value of SunAmp's collateral. 160 Upon execution of the loan documents,
Southwest began advancing SunAmp cash and letters of credit. 161 After
Southwest had committed funds in excess of $200,000 to SunAmp, it
discovered that SunAmp's investor's spouse had never signed the personal
guarantee. 162 Consequently, Southwest refused to advance any further funds. 163
However, it did attempt-unsuccessfully-to obtain the missing signature. l64
Southwest's additional efforts to save the deal failed,165 and it eventually
construction project brought action against permanent lender; permanent lender counterclaimed
for, among other things, breach of implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing);
Bike Fashion Corp. v. Kramer, 46 P.3d 431, 435-36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding, in part, that
it was prejudicial error to give jury instruction that owner could not be liable for breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if partnership agreement had express provision
on related subject, where partners sued other general partners for breach of contract, accounting,
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent transfer and
conveyance regarding sale of partnership real estate without consent of fifty-one percent of
partners); Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d
445, 465--66 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (denying summary judgment for claim that lessee breached
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in commercial lease, after lessee converted use from
supermarket to warehouse discount store).
154
838 P.2d 1314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
155Id. at 1315.
156Id.
157Id.
158Id.
159Id.

at 1315-16, 1317.
at 1316.

160Id.
161Id.
162Id.
163I d.
164Id.
165 For

example, Southwest's loan officer obtained SunAmp's financial statements in order
to determine whether it had sufficient assets to collateralize credit that had already been
extended on the line. Id. Based on her analysis of the financial statements, she determined that
SunAmp's borrowing base was sufficient to support neither the cash already advanced to
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terminated SunAmp's credit line and requested a plan for immediate
repayment of the loan. 166 After the deal fell through, Southwest sued SunAmp
for repayment of the loan. 167 SunAmp's counterclaims included a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. SunAmp alleged
that the breach occurred when Southwest froze SunAmp' s credit line, directed
it to stop using the letters of credit, terminated its line of credit, and demanded
the establishment of an immediate repayment plan. 168
Like the Conomos and Seidenberg courts, the SunAmp court addressed the
relationship between the implied covenant of good faith and express contract
terms. 169 In so doing, the court critiqued fairness-based notions of good faith as
particularly unhelpful, and further acknowledged that while "'the duty to act in
good faith does not alter the specific obligations of the parties under the
contract. ... [,] [a]cts in accord with the terms of one's contract cannot without
more be equated with bad faith. ,,,170
The court ameliorated its discomfort with the vague phrasing "without
more" by adopting Burton's approach. l7l Acknowledging that commerce
would come to a standstill if parties were forced to reduce all of their
expectations to express contract terms, the court invoked Burton's approach to
address unexpressed obligations relating to discretionary authority retained
under a contract. 172 The court quoted Burton:
The good faith performance doctrine may be said to permit the
exercise of discretion for any purpose-including ordinary business
purposes-reasonably within the contemplation of the parties. A
contract thus would be breached by a failure to perform in good faith
if a party uses its discretion for a reason outside the contemplated

SunAmp, nor the $120,000 already committed in the letters of credit that it had issued on behalf
of SunAmp. /d. In other words, due to its heavy reliance on the defective guarantee, Southwest
from the start had allowed SunAmp to exceed the borrowing base, in contravention of the
express terms of the loan agreement. Southwest continued to hold out hope, attempting to obtain
more current financial information from SunAmp that might enable Southwest to "thaw" the
credit freeze and proposing alternative ways to structure the loan so that the defective guarantee
would not be necessary. Id. at 1317. While waiting on the financial information, which SunAmp
could not immediately provide because it was in the midst of an internal audit and computer
system conversion, Southwest directed SunAmp to stop using one of the letters of credit. Id.
Unfortunately, the financial data, once it became available, revealed that SunAmp was not in
good financial shape. Id.
166/d.

at 1318.
at 1317-18.
169Id. at 1319.
170Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Gourmet Farms, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 422, 427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (second alteration in original».
171/d. at 1319-20.
mId. at 1319.
167Id.

168/d.
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range-a reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a
breach.173
Significantly, the court cited comment (a) to section 205 of the Restatement to
support its adoption of the foregone opportunities approach. 174 It explained that
"[c]onsistently with these Burton and Restatement formulations, our supreme
court has decided in a variety of contexts that a contracting party may exercise
a retained contractual power in bad faith"; it then discussed such findings in
the contexts of insurance bad faith cases and at-will employment cases. 175 The
court's conflation of the Burton and Restatement/Summers approaches was not
unwarranted. Rather, given the language in comment (a) to section 205 of the
Restatement-stating that "[g]ood faith performance . . . of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party,,176-the court was perfectly
justified in conflating the two approaches.
The remainder of the court's good faith discussion focused on SunAmp's
"justified expectations" under the contract, which-in the absence of any
allegation of ill will or spite on Southwest's part-turned on whether it was
"objectively reasonable" for Southwest to require and secure a valid guarantee
on the part of both the investor and his wife. l77 In a manner again consistent
with both Summers's and Burton's approaches to good faith, the court
emphasized the importance of context and fact specificity in good faith
inquiries; it held that, given the circumstances, SunAmp had no justifiable
expectation that a reasonable lender in the commercial lending industry would
act differently.l78

3. Contractor Cases
Contractors suing owners for breach of construction contracts often
additionally assert breach of good faith claims in their lawsuits. 179 Designer
I 73Id.
I 74Id.

at 1319-20.
at 1320.

I75Id.

§ 205 cmt. a.
177SunAmp Sys., 838 P.2d at 1320-21.

176RESTATEMENT

at 1321-22.
e.g., Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1990) (holding that,
while covenant of good faith is implied in all contracts, claims for tortious breach of good faith
are available only in exceptional circumstances); Whitlock Constr., Inc. v. South Big Hom
County Water Supply Joint Powers Bd., 41 P.3d 1261, 1269-70 (Wyo. 2002) (adopting
approach of Restatement section 205 to good faith in holding that municipal water board did not
breach implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or act arbitrarily and capriciously when it
canceled contract due to subsequent state agency disapproval of contractor in suit on public
contract by contractor against municipal water board); see also Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist
Constr., Inc., 18 P.3d 645, 658-59 (Wyo. 2001) (holding that contractor breached implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not providing sufficient time for subcontractor to
I 78Id.

179See,
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Direct, Inc. v. DeForest Redevelopment Authority,180 a case originating in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, provides a
comprehensive discussion of good faith in the context of construction
contracts. In Designer Direct, the plaintiff, doing business as Levin Associates
Architects ("Levin"), entered into a contract with the DeForest Redevelopment
Authority ("DRA") for the redevelopment of DeForest Village's downtown
area. 181 Pursuant to the redevelopment plan, Levin was to buy downtown
property from the DRA and construct buildings on it. 182 Things began to go
wrong between Levin and the DRA almost immediately. First, the express
contract terms required the DRA to provide Levin with a full-time liaison, but
the DRA provided only a part-time liaison. To resolve this problem, and over
Levin's explicit objections, the DRA outsourced the liaison services at
substantial additional COSt.1 83 Next, a dispute arose over a piece of the
redevelopment property known as Carriage Way.184 The DRA failed to
competently prepare parcels of Carriage Way so that they could be conveyed
to Levin, per the agreement, for construction and development. 185 This failure
forced Levin to make expensive changes to its own architectural drawings and
engineering plans, and prevented Levin from purchasing the Carriage Way
parcels on the contractually specified closing date, which the DRA refused to
push back. 186
A dispute over plans to construct a public library immediately precipitated
Levin's lawsuit. The redevelopment plan involved procuring an "anchor
tenant" for the downtown area. 187 Pursuant to the redevelopment agreement,
Levin had acquired the right to purchase and develop the site. 188 The DRA
wanted to place a library on the anchor tenant site, so it persuaded Levin to
give up its right to develop the site by promising Levin that it would be in
charge of the library design and construction. 189 Having agreed to this
compromise, Levin drafted an agreement for the construction of the library on
the site, which the DRA inexplicably refused to sign. 190 Levin alleged, and the
district court found, that the DRA had made other attempts to delay

remedy alleged deficiencies brought about by city property owner's postcontractual change in
street reconstruction project in suit by subcontractor against general contractor).
18°313 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2002).
181Id. at 1039.
182Id.

183ld. at 1039-40. The DRA eventually paid for the outsourced services. ld. at 1042.
184Id.
185Id.

at 1040.

The DRA's inability to prepare the parcels in an organized and timely manner
ultimately resulted in Levin incurring additional costs in the amount of $490,000. ld.
186Id.
187Id.
188Id.
189Id.
190Id.

HeinOnline -- 2005 Utah L. Rev. 29 2005

UTAH LAW REVIEW

30

[2005: 1

construction of the library.191 Shortly thereafter, Levin terminated its contracts
with the ORA and sued, asserting breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.l92 The district court found in favor of
Levin on the good faith claim.193 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 194
In setting forth Wisconsin's good faith law, the Seventh Circuit quoted
directly from comment (d) to section 205 of the Restatement, which adopts
Summers's excluder-analysis approach to good faith.195 While it declined to
"pigeonhole" the ORA's conduct into the categories of bad faith conduct
described in comment (d), the court found that the ORA's conduct violated the
covenant of good faith in both general and specific ways and that "the ORA's
conduct as a whole . . . violated the standards of fairness and
reasonableness." 196 For example, the court held that the ORA was
"uncooperative, evasive, and at times uninterested in the project.,,197 Moreover,
the court characterized the liaison-related delays, which adversely impacted
Levin's performance, as "[u]nreasonable" and its performance overall as
"disorganized.,,198 Finally, the court found that the ORA had abused its
discretionary power in interfering with Levin's attempt to develop a public
library on the anchor site. 199
The court's discussion of good faith makes clear that Wisconsin has
adopted the Restatement's and Summers's excluder analysis approach to good
faith. Moreover, when the implied good faith analysis is read in conjunction
with its breach of contract analysis relating to the Carriage Way property, the
opinion provides some important insights into the function of the good faith
doctrine in modern contract law.
With respect to the ORA's inability to prepare the Carriage Way parcels
for conveyance to and development by Levin, the ORA did not deny that it had
breached the contract; thus, the court focused its analysis on whether the
ORA's breach was material. 20o The court explained that in order for a breach to
be material, "it must be so serious as to destroy the essential object of the
agreement.,,201 In another portion of the opinion (which addressed material
breach of contract relating to the liaison dispute), the court further explained
191/d. at 1041. For example, the DRA secretly managed to convince the DeForest Library
Board to postpone signing the multiparty agreement in order to delay the library construction. /d.
at 1040.
192/d. at 1040, 1045.
I 93/d. at 1046.
I 94/d. at 1047.
I 95/d. at 1046-47.
I 96/d. at 1047.
I 97/d.
I 98/d.
I 99/d.

200/d.
201/d.

at 1043.
at 1043--44 (citing Ranes v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 580 N.W.2d 197,200 (Wis.

1998».
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that breaches are material when they affect "the 'core purpose,' the 'very
essence of the Agreement. ",202
What is interesting about the court's discussion of materiality is that it
sounds in the rhetoric of good faith, especially where the court describes a
material breach as one that destroys "the essential object" of the contract, and
that affects its "core purpose" and "very essence.,,203 Moreover, section 241 of
the Restatement, which provides several different factors for courts to consider
in determining whether a breach is material, explicitly lists as two of its factors
"the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he
reasonably expected,,,204 and "the extent to which the behavior of the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith
and fair dealing.,,205 Thus, the Restatement makes clear the relationship
between good faith and material breach: whether a breaching party has acted in
bad faith will assist courts in determining whether the breaching party has
committed a material breach, thereby justifying the nonbreaching party's
suspension of his performance under the contract.
It is important to recognize the Restatement's linking of good faith and
material breach, and to understand that the Restatement does not equate
absolutely good faith with material breach as a theoretical matter. Yet, for all
practical purposes, good faith rhetoric-with its emphasis on the reasonable
expectations of the parties and its prohibition on the evasion of the spirit or
essence of the contract---corresponds very closely with the rhetoric of material
breach.
4. Commercial Real Estate Leases

Cases involving commercial leases of real estate often implicate good
faith because, even between equally sophisticated lessors and lessees, the
lessor has reserved discretionary authority under the contract to approve, for
example, subsequent subleasing of the property by the lessee. 206 Carma
202Id. at 1042 (quoting district court findings). The difference between a material and
nonmaterial breach is important because it determines the performance obligations of the
nonbreaching party. If the breaching party commits a material breach, the nonbreaching party is
entitled to suspend her performance obligations under the contract; moreover, she may later
cancel the contract and discharge her obligations if that material breach ripens into a total breach
due to failure to cure within a reasonable time. RESTATEMENT §§ 237, 241, 242. On the other
hand, if the breach is a nonmaterial one, the nonbreaching party is not entitled to suspend her
performance under the contract; she must continue to perform or, if she wrongly believes she
may suspend performance, risk committing material breach of the contract herself. [d. In
particular, section 241 provides guidance on how to determine whether a breach is material. [d. §
241.
203Designer Direct, 313 F.3d at 1042-44.
204RESTATEMENT § 241(a).
205Id. § 241(e).
206See, e.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 712
(Cal. 1992) (involving recapture clause allowing termination of lease upon request to sublet or
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Developers (Cal), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. 207 is such a
case. Since it was decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1992, it has
become a leading case on commercial good faith. The Carma opinion not only
provides its readers with a thorough survey of the different models of good
faith, but it also speaks to the issue of how and why the law distinguishes
between contractual and tortious breaches of good faith.208
In Carma, Marathon leased the thirtieth floor of a large office building to
Carma for a term of ten years at a base rental rate of $22 per square foot per
year?09 As is typical in the commercial leasing industry, the lease included two
provisions relating to Carma's subleasing and assignment rights. 210 First, the
lease required Carma to obtain Marathon's written consent-which Marathon
could not unreasonably withhold-before assigning and subletting any portion
of the lease and property to a third party.211 Second, the lease required Carma
to provide Marathon with written notice identifying the intended sublessee or
assignee and disclosing to Marathon the specific terms of any intended
sublease or assignment by Carma. 212 Significantly, this latter provision also
gave Marathon the right, within thirty days of receipt of notice from Carma, to
terminate the lease with Carma and thereafter to enter into a new lease for the
premises with the sublessee or assignee previously identified in the written
notice.213 In other words, this lease provision contractually enabled Marathon
exclusively to capture any profit to be made on such a subletting or
assignment.
During the first few years of the lease term, Carma made major
improvements to the premises. 214 About five years into the lease term, Carma
decided to relocate its headquarters to another city.215 Subsequently, Carma
submitted a written notice requesting Marathon's permission to sublet the floor
to an identified third-party subtenant, Grubb & Ellis, at a sublet rate of
approximately $33 per square foot per year, which exceeded Carma's rental
rate by about $11 per square foot per year. 216 Predictably, Marathon declined to
assignment); Warner v. Konover, 553 A.2d 1138, 114~1 (Conn. 1989) (reserving landlord's
discretionary authority to withhold consent oflease assignment).
207 826 P.2d 710 (Cal. 1992).
208For further discussion of the tortious and contractual breaches of good faith, see infra
Part II.B.3.
209Carma, 826 P.2d at 712-13.
2101d. at 713.
2111d. Paragraph 15(a) of the lease stated: "Tenant shall not, without the prior written
consent of Landlord, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, assign this Lease or any
interest herein or sublet the Premises or any part thereof, or permit the use or occupancy of the
Premises by any person other than Tenant." Id.
2121d.
213I d.

2141d.
2151d.
2161d. Carma presumably set this higher sublet rate to reflect the value of the improvements
it had made to the premises.
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give its consent, terminated the lease with Canna, and attempted to enter into a
new lease agreement with Grubb & Ellis.217
Upon Marathon's termination of the lease, Canna sued for breach of the
lease, as well as for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and interference with prospective economic advantage. 218 On Canna's
motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that Marathon violated the
lease tenns by unreasonably withholding its consent to sublease the premises
to Grubb & Ellis.219 The court also implied a "commercial reasonableness"
standard into the lease and found that Marathon's attempts to "appropriate
sublease profits was not commercially reasonable.,,22o Finally, the court ruled
that "Marathon's refusal to consent to the sublease, termination of the lease,
and refusal to permit Canna to recover the unamortized value of its
improvements breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.,,221
In its lengthy discussion of the covenant of good faith, the California
Supreme Court drew from the approaches of Burton, Summers, and the U.C.C.
in order to piece together a comprehensive articulation of good faith.222 The
court initially identified the case as one involving a "situation[ ] where one
party is invested with a discretionary power affecting the rights of another." 223
It invoked Burton's foregone opportunities approach, stating that in such cases,
"[s]uch power must be exercised in good faith.,,224 The court then looked, in
part, to the U.C.C.'s approach to good faith and suggested that good faith
analysis "has both a subjective and objective aspect-subjective good faith and
objective fair dealing. A party violates the covenant if it subjectively lacks
belief in the validity of its act or if its conduct is objectively unreasonable.,,225
The court further observed that Burton's foregone opportunities model tended

217Id. The deal between Marathon and Grubb & Ellis never materialized, however, and it
took Marathon an additional year or so to secure another tenant for the thirtieth floor. Id.
218Id.
219Id.
22oId.

at 713-14.

221Id. The damages claim relating to the breach of contract and breach of good faith duty
were tried to a jury, as was the claim for interference with prospective economic advantage. Id.
at 714. The jury awarded Carma $14,468.83 on the breach of contract claim, and $300,649.49reflecting the unamortized value of Carma's improvements to the premises--on the breach of
good faith claim. Id. The trial court further awarded Carma costs, expenses, and attorneys fees in
the amount of $142,578.08. Id. Marathon appealed and the intermediate appellate court affirmed
in all respects but one: it remanded on the issue of costs. Id. The California Supreme Court
addressed a host of property-related issues, including the issues of whether the recapture clause
set forth in Paragraph 15(b) of the parties' contract constituted an unlawful restraint on
alienation, and whether the contract terms could be interpreted in a manner consistent with
policy set forth in state statutes which favored transferability of leaseholds. Id. at 715-21.
mId. at 726-28.
223Id. at 726.
224Id.
225Id.

at 727.
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toward the objective aspect of good faith. 226 The court also acknowledged
Summers's approach to good faith-which had been adopted by the
Restatement-and recognized that Summers's approach differed theoretically,
or at least rhetorically, from Burton's, in its negative definition of good faith.227
Rather than choosing one approach over another, the court culled from its
survey of decisions some principles that were-with one exceptionconsistent with both the Burton and Summers approaches. To begin with, the
court noted that "breach of a specific provision of the contract is not a
necessary prerequisite" for a contractual good faith claim,228 a statement with
which neither Burton nor Summers would disagree.229 Next, the court observed
that although dishonesty may result in bad faith conduct, it is not a required
element of a breach of good faith claim, at least under Summers's excluder
analysis and Burton's economic approaches. 23o As the court put it,
"[d]ishonesty presupposes subjective immorality; the covenant of good faith
can be breached for objectively unreasonable conduct, regardless of the actor's
motive.'.231 The court also stated that the good faith covenant may not be
applied to prohibit what a party may do under the express terms of the
contract. 232 Ultimately, the court used this particular component of the good
faith doctrine to reverse the lower courts on the issue of good faith. The court
held that Marathon's termination of the lease with Carma-even assuming that
its motivation for termination was to appropriate the increased value of the
premises, as reflected in Carma's proposed sublease to Grubb & Ellis-was
"expressly permitted by the agreement.,,233 Thus, Carma could not employ the
good faith covenant in order to circumvent what the contract expressly
permitted.

226See id. ("In the case of a discretionary power, it has been suggested the covenant
requires the party holding such power to exercise it 'for any purpose within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to capture opportunities that were
preserved upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively.'" (quoting Burton, supra note 7, at
373».
227Id. ("[I]t has also been suggested the covenant is not susceptible to firm definition but
must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Instead of defining what is consistent with good faith
and fair dealing, it is more meaningful to concentrate on what is prohibited." (citing Summers,
Good Faith, supra note 7, at 204-06».
228Id. (citing Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 908 (8th Cir. 1985)).
229See Burton, supra note 7, at 386 (asserting that breach of contract can occur if "a party
uses its discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range"); Summers, Good Faith, supra
note 7, at 199 (noting potential of good faith to be independent theory that can be used to prevent
abuses, even in absence of elements of estoppel).
230Carma, 826 P.2d at 727 (citing Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 204-06); see
also Burton, supra note 7, at 378 (defining failure to perform in good faith in breach of
contract).
231Carma, 826 P.2d at 727.
232Id. at 728. It is important to note, however, that such an express provision could be
invalidated on other equitable grounds such as unconscionability or misrepresentation.
233Id. at 729.
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The court found it necessary to expand on the fact that good faith may not
be used to prohibit a party from doing that which the contract expressly
permits, and asserted that:
the scope of conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith is
circumscribed by the purposes and express terms of the contract. . . .
[for] the implied covenant of good faith is read into contracts "in order
to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to
protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to the
contract's purpose.,,234
While such a statement may be entirely consistent with Burton's
economic approach to good faith, it is not clear that it is consistent with
Summers's approach, in light of Summers's emphasis on community standards
and fairness, and on the doctrine's potential to "do justice and do it according
to law.,,235 The court's discussion in this regard is interesting because, while it
recognized the theoretical distinction between the Summers and Burton
approaches to good faith, it demonstrated how a fused Summers-Burton
approach can be employed to effect a somewhat schizophrenic result that is
consistent with both models' prescriptions against using good faith to
circumvent express terms of a contract. At the same time, it is seemingly
inconsistent with Summers's overarching focus on fairness and justice and
Burton's overarching focus on the prevention of opportunistic behavior. In
other words, the good faith doctrine is important and necessary in contract law
because it functions to prevent opportunism, unfairness, and injusticeexemplified by Marathon's conduct-but if the contract expressly authorizes
such opportunism and injustice, then it is all right to forego those important
principles.
B. Cases Involving Unequal Bargaining Power

Although this Part is divided into the two analytically useful categories of
'arm's-length commercial cases' and 'cases involving unequal bargaining
power,' it does not suggest that any given transaction, commercial or not, may
be so easily characterized. In most cases, there is neither perfect equality of
sophistication, nor drastic imbalance of power between contracting parties.
Rather, in most cases, contracting parties possess differing levels of
sophistication and/or naivete relating to different aspects of the transaction. To
the extent there exists an imbalance of power and sophistication between the
parties, the imbalance exists to varying degrees. For the purposes of this
Article, and in order to determine whether the application of good faith to nonarm's-length transactions differs from its application to arm's-length ones, this
234Jd. at 727 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 394 (Cal. 1988)).
235Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 198.
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Part focuses on particular categories of transactions that are characterized by
varying degrees of power imbalance between the contracting parties. Thus, the
following discussion examines a spectrum of such cases, beginning with a look
at cases involving contracting parties-whose relationships are characterized
inherently by a small degree of power or sophistication imbalance-and
ending with a look at cases involving parties whose relationships are
characterized inherently by a greater degree of power imbalance. As such, this
Part looks at four different categories of cases: franchisor/franchisee and
dealer/distributor cases, lost commissions cases, at-will employment cases, and
consumer contract cases.
1. Franchisor/Franchisee and Dealer/Distributor Cases
Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp./36 discussed at length by the Seidenberg
court,237 is another leading commercial good faith case. The facts in Wilson
exemplify the sorts of disputes that arise in franchise and distributor cases,
which generally arise out of the franchisor's or distributor's discretionary
price-setting authority.238 Amerada Hess Corporation ("Hess"), the defendant
in Wilson, produced, refined, and distributed gasoline and other related
petroleum products.239 The three plaintiffs were independent franchise dealers
of Hess gasoline, each of whom leased and operated a gasoline station pursuant
to a dealership agreement ("Agreement") with Hess. 24o The Agreement
provided in relevant part that the gasoline prices were to be set by Hess
according to competing prices in the geographic area and that the gas prices
were "subject to change at any time without notice.,,241
The disputes between Hess and the plaintiffs arose from changes to
Hess ~ s business practices over the course of approximately twenty years,
during which time Hess gradually transformed from an independent dealerbased distributorship to a cooperative-based business. 242 In shifting to a
cooperative-based business, Hess replaced its pricing policy with one that,
plaintiffs alleged, reduced their profits so drastically that plaintiffs would

236 77 3
237See

A.2d 1121 (N.J. 2001).
supra Part II.A. (describing Burton's foregone opportunities approach to good

faith).
238 For another example of this type of dispute, see Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493,
498 (Colo. 1995) (explaining that duty of good faith applies when either party has "discretionary
authority to determine certain terms of contract," such as price).
239 Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1124.

240Id.
241Id.
242Id. In dealing with dealers such as the plaintiffs, Hess's initial approach allowed
independent dealers, like the plaintiffs, a profit margin by setting the retail price on the gasoline
at a level "significantly below the price charged by major national brands" and by contractually
restricting them from providing automotive services. Id.
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eventually be forced out of business altogether. 243 The plaintiffs asserted that
Hess used different pricing practices with its own cooperative stations,
practices designed to allow the cooperatives to achieve reasonable levels of
profitability; in contrast, plaintiffs alleged that Hess "knowingly set[] its ...
prices at a level that [WOUld] not allow the dealers [like plaintiffs] to cover
operating expenses and achieve profit.,,244 In other words, the plaintiffs alleged
that Hess discriminated against independent dealers by employing different
price-setting practices in order to drive out independent dealers so that Hess
could replace them with its own cooperative stations.
The court began its good faith analysis with the standard mantras:
"Although the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override
an express term in a contract, a party's performance under a contract may
breach that implied covenant even though that performance does not violate a
pertinent express term.,,245 The court also pointed out that, "[u]nlike many
other states, in New Jersey, 'a party to a contract may breach the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in performing its obligations even when
it exercises an express and unconditional right to terminate. ",246 In discussing
what constitutes good faith performance, the court also predictably and aptly
referred to the U.C.C.'s definition of good faith ("honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade,,247),
and the Restatement's "reasonable expectations" and excluder-analysis
approaches to good faith.248 The court engaged in a lengthy analysis of
Burton's foregone opportunities model of good faith and, ultimately, chose
correctly to apply that model in this context, because it did not involve a
problem of gap-filling but of the unilateral discretionary authority reserved to
one party under the contract. 249 The court further explained that Burton's
approach-which it noted maximized economic efficiency--could be
subsumed within the "reasonable expectations" definition of good faith.25o The
243/d. at 1124-25. In fact, one of the plaintiffs had been forced out of business at the time
the lawsuit was filed. /d. at 1125. In terms of the pricing practices themselves, the plaintiffs
claimed that Hess's new practices resulted in prices comparable to major-brand prices and
substantially higher than unbranded gasoline prices. Id. Because major-brand stations offered far
more services to offset their higher retail prices, which services plaintiffs were contractually
restricted from offering, plaintiffs could not compete with the major brand stations. Id.
244/d.

at 1126.
(quoting Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Bordon, Inc., 690 A.2d 575,587 (N.J. 1997)).
247/d. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-103(i)(b) (West 2004)).
248/d. at 1126-27. "Good faith performance ... of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." RESTATEMENT § 205 cmt. a.
249 Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1127.
250/d. The court stated: "Here we are confronted with the question of the appropriate force
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in reviewing the actions of a contracting
party expressly vested with unilateral discretionary authority over pricing. Stated differently, the
task here is to identify in that context the parties' reasonable expectations." Id.
245/d.
246/d.
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court also undertook a comprehensive review of the relevant decisions and
reasoned that it was obligated to "respect and give effect" to Hess's express
right under its Dealership Agreements to set, within its discretion, the price of
the gasoline it sold to the plaintiffs. 251 "But," the court continued, "the
discretion afforded to Hess is not unbridled discretion. Hess's performance
under the contract is tempered by the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and the reasonable expectations of the parties." 252
The court took the further step of refining and restating the test for good
faith in the context of discretionary price setting by franchisors and/or
distributors such as Hess:
[A] party exercising its right to use discretion in setting price under a
contract breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing if that party
exercises its discretionary authority arbitrarily, unreasonably, or
capriciously, with the objective of preventing the other party from
receiving its reasonably expected fruits under the contract. 253
While the Wilson court must be commended for this valiant attempt at
refining the good faith standard, it did little more than synthesize and restate
the various approaches to good faith, albeit in a more specific context. And
while this was certainly no small task, given the messy state of the doctrine,
the "new" test remains rhetorically tautological, in that words like "arbitrarily,"
"unreasonably," and "capriciously" simply signal forms of conduct opposite to
good faith, or, forms of bad faith conduct. In this regard, then, the test most
closely resembles Summers's excluder-analysis model of good faith. 254
Finally, the court's comprehensive review of the relevant decisions did
turn up the issue of motive, which the Wilson court-unlike the Carma courtfound was an element of the discretionary bad faith claim. 255 The court found
that Hess's specific intent to destroy the plaintiffs' ability to compete in the
gasoline market, as well as its specific intent to replace independent franchise
dealers with its own cooperative stations through its discriminatory pricesetting practices, was an improper motive. 256 The court remanded the case on
the improper motive issue, requiring the lower court to give the plaintiffs the
opportunity to discover circumstantial evidence to support their allegations of
.
Hess's bad motive. 257
at 1130.
252Id.
253Id.
254See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 201.
255 Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1128. In particular, the court found through its survey of the cases
that "various courts have stated that a party must exercise discretion reasonably and with proper
motive when that party is vested with the exercise of discretion under a contract." Id. (emphasis
added).
256Id. at 1131.
257Id. at 1132.
25 lId.
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2. Lost Commissions Cases

Lost commissions cases are, in a sense, the original and classic good faith
cases. The typical case involves an independent contractor or at-will employee
working on commission, who invariably asserts that her employer has
attempted in bad faith to avoid paying already-earned commissions by
terminating the employment relationship just prior to a predetermined vesting
date. It is easy to see how all of the articulations of good faith discussed in this
Article might be implicated in lost commissions cases: the independent
contractor or employee feels that she has been deprived of the fruits of the
bargain and of her reasonable expectations under the contract-the already
earned commissions-and that this deprivation has been effected by the
employer's abuse of discretion in terminating her employment in the at-will
employment context. An exemplary case is McCollum v. XCare.net, Inc}58
decided by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in 2002. Its discussion of good faith supplements this Article's prior
discussions of discretionary bad faith by demonstrating the interplay between
lost commissions cases and more traditional at-will employment cases (which
are discussed at length in Part II.B.3, infra).
In mid-2000, XCare.net ("XC are") hired Anne McCollum as a regional
sales manager, compensating her both on a salary and commissions basis.259
McCollum was immediately assigned the task of consummating a
comprehensive contract with XCare's single existing customer in the region,
Foundation Health Systems ("FHS"), which contract was worth approximately
$10 million. Initially, McCollum was able to secure a signing date with FHS
for late September. 260 However, FHS pushed the signing back a few weeks to
mid-October. 261 Pending the ongoing negotiations over the larger contract,
FHS and XCare entered into an interim agreement so that XCare could earn
revenue from its ongoing dealings with FHS?62
Less than one week later, XCare terminated McCollum, effective October
11 at the close of business, because of her purportedly substandard work
performance. XCare also informed McCollum that, although she had been
removed officially from the FHS account, she would receive commissions on
the account through September thirtieth. 263 In mid-October, McCollom
received her last paycheck, which reflected both her salary and commission on
the interim agreement that had been signed by FHS and XCare. McCollum,
however, refused to sign her resignation agreement because it precluded her
258

212 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
at 1144.

259/d.
260/d.
261/d.
262/d.
263/d.

at 1144-45.
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from receiving a commission on the larger FHS contract, which was executed
on October twentieth. 264 XCare refused to pay her the commission on the larger
contract, which amounted to almost $600,000, claiming that McCollum had
already resigned. 265 McCollum filed suit, alleging breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith, and unconscionability of XCare's
compensation plan. 266
As usual in lost commissions cases, the court employed the discretionary
approach to good faith.267 Quoting Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc.,268 a well~
known California good faith decision, the court stated that '''where a contract
confers one party with discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, a
duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in good faith and in accordance with
fair dealing. ",269 The McCollum court analogized Locke and held that in lost
commissions cases, contractually reserved discretion must not be exercised in a
manner that would frustrate the purpose of the underlying contract or the
counter~party's reasonable expectations; good faith exercise of discretion does
not as a practical or theoretical matter eliminate the express granting of such
discretionary authority. 270
The court also clarified that, with respect to good faith analyses, some lost
commissions cases are distinguishable from at~will employment cases in an
important way, even though both obviously implicate the doctrine of at~will
employment. 271 Specifically, the court pointed out that in at~will employment
cases, the good faith doctrine may not be used in California to "impose
substantive limits on an employer's authority to terminate an at~will
employee," while the doctrine could be used to invalidate bad faith termination
in an at~will context where the employee could show that her termination
"'was a mere pretext to cheat the worker out of another contract benefit to
which the employee. was clearly entitled. ",272 The court held that because
264Id.
265Id.

at 1145.

at 1145-52.
at 1152; see also Trent Partners & Assocs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F. Supp.
2d 84, 101-02 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that principal cannot terminate agent to deny
commission due without "good cause"); Winfree v. Educators Credit Union, 900 S.W.2d 285,
289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (prohibiting defendants from retaining benefits acquired from acts
committed in good faith); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 221
(Wyo. 1994) (finding compensatory damages available to hold employers accountable for breach
of implied covenant).
268
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Ct. App. 1997).
269Mc Collum, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (quoting Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925). Locke was
not a lost commissions case, but rather involved Warner Bros.'s alleged bad faith in its
exercising of a satisfaction clause relating to a "no pay, no play" provision. The Locke court
ultimately held that such inherently discretionary satisfaction clauses must be exercised in good
faith-that is, they must be exercised honestly. Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925.
27oMc Collum, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
271Id. at 1152-53.
272Id. at 1153 (quoting Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1112 n.18 (Cal. 2000»; see
also Houh, supra note 8 at 1066-88 (demonstrating how implied obligation of good faith in
266Id.

267Id.
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McCollum's case exemplified the latter situation-the classic
commissions situation-she could proceed with her good faith claim. 273

41
lost

3. At-Will Employment Cases

Courts are split on whether, and to what extent, the implied covenant of
good faith applies to at-will employment contracts. For example, states like
New York, Texas, Illinois, Maryland, and Oregon do not recognize the
covenant in the at-will employment context,274 while states like New Jersey,
Delaware, Arizona, New Hampshire, and Connecticutdo. 275 And, in states like
contract law can provide alternate remedies to at-will employees when they are not able to
obtain civil rights remedies).
273 McCollum, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
274See, e.g., Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(holding that under Illinois law, there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract); Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1076--77 (Md.
1991) (ruling that there is no general requirement of good faith and fair dealing in at-will
employment contract); Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919,922 (N.Y. 1987) (ruling
that although New York recognizes obligation of good faith and fair dealing in cases where such
obligation would aid and further other terms of contract, such covenant does not apply in
employment contract); Sheets v. Knight, 779 P.2d 1000, 1007-08 (Or. 1989) (deciding that duty
of good faith and fair dealing does not modify term of at-will employment contract); City of
Midland v. o 'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000) (fmding that there is no duty of good
faith and fair dealing in employment context); see also Dickens v. Snodgrass, Dunlap & Co.,
872 P.2d 252,261 (Kan. 1994) (holding that rule that every contract imposes duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance does not apply to employment at-will contracts); Martin v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 899 P.2d 551, 555 (Nev. 1995) (finding that breach of contract and bad
faith discharge are not applicable to at-will employment contracts); Bourgeous v. Horizon
Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 852-57 (N.M. 1994) (declining to recognize claims for breach
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment contracts, but recognizing that
in non-at-will contexts, claims for tortious breach of good faith may be cognizable); Burk v. KMart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 26 (Okla. 1989) (ruling that there is no implied obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in relation to termination of at-will employment contract); Breen v. Dakota Gear
& Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221, 224 (S.D. 1988) (holding that covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is not implied in at-will employment relationship).
275See, e.g., Franco v. Yale Univ., 238 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454-55 (D. Conn. 2002) (deciding
that Connecticut imposes duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts, including
employment contracts); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz.
1985) (finding that although covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not protect at-will
employee from no-cause termination, covenant does protect employee from discharge based on
employer's desire to avoid payment of benefits already earned by employee, as with lost
commissions cases); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440 (Del.
1996) (ruling that in at-will employment context, covenant of good faith and fair dealing permits
cause of action against employer for "deceitful acts of its agent in manufacturing materially false
grounds to cause an employee's dismissal"); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,551
(N.H. 1974) (holding that termination by employer of at-will employment contract "which is
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation" is not in best interest of economic
system or public good and constitutes breach of employment contract); Wade v. Kessler Inst.,
778 A.2d 580, 584 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (deciding that "obligation to perform in
good faith exists in every contract including where the contract is terminable at will"); see also
Johnson v. Kimberly Clark Worldwide, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (D. Utah 2000) (holding
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California, the courts take a bifurcated approach to good faith claims in the atwill context, recognizing claims for contractual breach of good faith but not
tortious breach of good faith.276
Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc.,m decided by the Seventh Circuit in
1987, is generally regarded as a case about closely held corporations,
shareholder abuse, and federal securities fraud,278 but it also can teach us about
the implied obligation of good faith in the at-will employment context. James
Jordan was employed as a securities analyst at Duff and Phelps ("Duff'), a
Chicago securities/consulting firm. Because Jordan was an at-will employee,
Duff could terminate him when it wished, and Jordan could likewise quit the
finn when he wished. After several successful years, Jordan was allowed to
enter into a share purchase agreement with the firm, and he bought 188 shares
at book value. 279 The share purchase agreement also required Jordan to resell
the stock to the firm at book value in the event that his employment with Duff
tenninated. 280
In the meantime, Jordan decided to relocate to Houston, where he had
accepted a position with a firm at roughly twice his Duff salary. Immediately
upon his return from Houston, Jordan tendered his letter of resignation to the
finn.281 In an attempt to maximize the book value of his Duff shares, which
Jordan was required contractually to resell to Duff upon his separation from
the firm, Jordan and the firm worked out a deal whereby Jordan would remain

that under Utah law, even indefinite-term, at-will employment contracts are subject to implied
covenant of good faith); Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (ruling
that duty of good faith "does not evaporate merely because the contract is an employment
contract, and the employee has been held to be an employee at will").
276See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,395 (Cal. 1988); Houh, supra note 8,
at 1085 (noting California courts' adoption of narrow Restatement approach to good faith and its
concerns that doctrine of good faith might lead to convergence of contract and tort law); see also
McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 119 F.3d 876, 882 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that "[u]nder
Wyoming law, every contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and enforcement"; however, there is no duty that termination be for good cause or
for fair and honest reasons and to assert tortious breach of good faith, plaintiff must show
existence of "special relationship" of trust and reliance between former employee and
employer).
277
815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
278In this regard, the case is also well known because Judge Easterbrook, who penned the
majority opinion, and Judge Posner, who dissented, disagreed vehemently over whether Jordan
could assert an SEC Rule lOb-5 claim against Duff and Phelps. In the end, Judge Easterbrook
won out, and held that Jordan could indeed assert such a cause of action. Id. at 438.
279Id. at 432.
280Id. Jordan later discovered, however, that Carol Franchik, a terminated employee who
had been having an affair with Duffs chairman, had been allowed by board resolution to retain
the stock she had purchased as an employee. Although the scope of this resolution was not
entirely clear, it apparently applied to all fired employees, but not to employees who quit
voluntarily. Id.
28 lId.
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with the firm for the rest of the year.282 Thus, Jordan worked through
December and then tendered his stock to the company, ultimately receiving
$23,225 for the book value of the shares he had owned. 283 Jordan subsequently
learned from an announcement made by Duff a little more than a week after
his resignation that it had negotiated what then appeared to be a successful new
merger agreement with another large securities firm, which merger was valued
at $50 million. 284 Had he been an employee of Duff on the date of the
announcement, he would have received no less than $452,000 in cash for his
shares. 285 As a result, Jordan refused to cash his check for $23,225 and
demanded his stock back. 286 When Duff ignored these demands, Jordan filed
suit, requesting damages reflecting the value his stock would have had under
the merger. 287
In holding, for Rule 10b-5 purposes, that Duff and Phelps should have
disclosed to Jordan the material information relating to the impending merger
when it repurchased Jordan's shares, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
majority and against dissenting Judge Posner, commented on the general
nature of the at-will employment relationship in Illinois?88 First, Judge
Easterbrook stated that an employer may not terminate an at-will employee,
simply because of his at-will status, for "every reason.,,289 He further noted that
Illinois had, in fact, placed some limitations on the at-will employment
doctrine?90 Judge Easterbrook also acknowledged the potential for
opportunism in employment relationships generally, particularly on the part of
the employer, the inherently stronger party.291 He recognized that, from an
economic efficiency perspective, "[0 ]ne term implied in every written contract
... is that neither party will try to take opportunistic advantage of the other"
and quoted from Judge Posner's book Economic Analysis of Law to emphasize

282/d. What Jordan did not know was that, at the time of his resignation, Duff and Phelps
management had been attempting for several months to negotiate a merger between Duff and a
subsidiary of Security Pacific, which negotiations had failed. Id. Duff did not disclose this
information to Jordan at the time of Jordan's resignation, nor did Duff disclose to Jordan at this
time that it was then in the process of another round of merger discussions with Security Pacific.
Id. Instead, Duff simply allowed Jordan to work through the end of 1983 so that he would be
able to take advantage of the higher book value that would then apply to the stock repurchase.
Id. at 433.
283/d.
284/d.
285 Id.
286/d.
287/d. This second attempted merger between Duff and Security Pacific ultimately failed.
Id. Two years later, however, Duff was acquired, again at a very high price, in a leveraged
buyout by an employee trust. Id. In order to capture the benefit of that buyout, Jordan sued for
rescission but was allowed only damages. Id. at 440.
288/d. at 438.
289/d.
290/d.
291/d.
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the point. 292 Judge Easterbrook also noted that the opportunism issue presents
difficult proof problems: did the employer-defendant discharge the employee
opportunistically or because of the employee's poor performance? Judge
Easterbrook further observed that courts and juries must ferret out the reasons
for such discharge so they can discern between the two motivations.293 To
emphasize that he was not eviscerating the doctrine of employment at-will or
capitulating to some feel-good, fuzzy notion of good faith discharge in this
context, Judge Easterbrook further stated, that "no one, not even Professor
[Richard] Epstein, doubts that an avowedly opportunistic discharge is a breach
of contract, although the employment is at-will.,,294
Throughout most of his analysis, Judge Easterbrook did not use the words
"good faith," even though (Burton's model of) the good faith doctrine was
precisely what he was applying in the case. When he finally did recognize
explicitly that the court's admonition against opportunistic behavior was really
an affirmation of the applicability of the implied covenant of good faith in the
context of at-will employment, he did so in order to assure us (or Judge
Posner) of his commitment to classically liberal notions of freedom of contract.
He wrote:
The element of good faith dealing implied in a contract "is not an
enforceable legal duty to be nice to or to behave decently in a general
way." It is not a version of the Golden Rule, to regard the interests of
one's contracting partner the same way you regard your own. An
employer may be thoughtless, nasty, and mistaken. Avowedly
opportunistic conduct has been treated differently, however. 295
Thus, Judge Easterbrook predictably opined, good faith and economic
efficiency are perfectly consistent, even in the context of inherently powerimbalanced relationships-just as Burton has asserted all along. 296
The New Jersey courts engaged in less explicitly economic and more
conventional analyses of good faith in the at-will employment context. Wade v.
292See id. (,"[T]he fundamental function of contract law (and recognized as such at least
since Hobbes's day) is to deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting
parties, in order to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and to make costly selfprotective measures unnecessary.'" (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
81 (3rd ed. 1986»); see also Houh, supra note 8, at 1041 (explaining that contract law
discourages opportunistic behavior and promotes efficiency).
293Jordan, 815 F.2d at 438.
294!d.
295!d. (citation omitted).
296Judge Posner's dissent rested on the notion that, due to the at-will nature of Jordan's
employment, he could not in any event have demanded a higher price for his stock. Thus, he was
not entitled to the higher price for the stock. Given his decision to relocate to Houston, and
pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Jordan simply could not refuse to sell his shares back to
the firm upon his separation from it, just as Jordan, under the doctrine of at-will employment,
could not have refused to stop working if Duff had fired him. !d. at 446 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Kessler Institute 297 is a typical at-will termination case that involves policies
set forth in an employee handbook. In Wade, plaintiff Sheila Wade worked her
way up to unit secretary during her nine years of employment at the Kessler
Institute. One of her duties involved collecting money from her co-workers for
various "special" occasions, such as weddings, showers, and funerals. 298 She
would place anonymous cash donations made by her co-workers in an
envelope and then, once all the money was collected, present the cash-filled
envelope to its recipient. 299 After she had been doing this for about five years,
her supervisor asked her to begin collections for a co-worker. Wade started to
collect the money, took an eight-day medical leave, and then, upon her return
from leave, completed the collection of the money for the co-worker plus two
other co-workers. 30o
Shortly after her return, Wade's supervisor Joan Alverzo suspended her
for allegedly mishandling the collection moneys, which had not yet been given
to their intended recipients. 301 When Wade met with Alverzo to give her the
suspect collections, Alverzo fired Wade for improperly handling the money.
Wade's arguably reasonable explanations made no difference. 302 Alverzo also
claimed that one of the envelopes was missing five dollars, which Wade
denied. 303 Because she felt that her firing was unjustified, Wade availed herself
of the grievance procedures set forth in the employee handbook. 304 She made
several written requests to various upper level managers, to no avail; in fact,
she received no responses at all. 305 Wade became so despondent over the fact
that "no one would believe her" that she became suicida1. 306
Consequently, Wade sued the hospital for wrongful discharge and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 307 At trial, the jury
decided in Wade's favor on the good faith claim. 308 The hospital appealed on
the grounds that the trial court "failed to instruct the jury that a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing required a finding of bad faith
on the part of the defendant.,,309 Wade, of course, disagreed and argued that
bad faith was not an element of a breach of good faith claim. 3lO The court

A.2d 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
at 582.
at 582-83.
at 583.

297 778

298Id.
299Id.
300Id.
301Id.
302

•
Id
.
Id
304Id•

303

305Id.
306 .
Id
307Id.
308Id.
309Id.
310Id.

at 582-83.
at 583.
at 584.
at 588.
HeinOnline -- 2005 Utah L. Rev. 45 2005

46

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2005: 1

ultimately reversed and remanded on other grounds/II but in further analyzing
the good faith issue, the court emphasized that in New Jersey, the implied
obligation of good faith inheres in all contracts, including at-will employment
contracts. 312 And, although the court did not definitively hold that bad faith is a
required element of a breach of good faith claim in all cases, the court made
clear that both the V.e.e. 's definition of good faith and the Restatement's
adoption of Summers's excluder-analysis approach were particularly valuable
and useful in cases such as the one before it. 313 The court also found useful
Alaska's approach to good faith in the at-will employment context:
"This covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] does not lend itself to
precise definition, but it requires at a minimum that an employer not
impair the right of an employee to receive the benefits of the
employment agreement. . . . The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing ... includes an objective standard, under which the employer
must act in a manner which a reasonable person would regard as fair.
The covenant also includes a subjective element. An employer
engages in subjective bad faith when it discharges an employee for
the purpose of depriving him or her of one of the benefits of the
contract.,,314
Thus, the court applied a comprehensive Restatement approach that
defined good faith as the absence of bad faith, and further defined bad faith as
the discharging of an employee for the purpose of depriving her of her
reasonable expectations and benefits under the employment contract. In other
words, like the court in Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.,315 the Wade court
noted that, in the employment context in particular, bad motive or intention to
deprive the employee of her reasonable expectations plays an essential role. 316

4. Consumer Contract Cases
Consumer cases implicate the most inherently power-imbalanced
contractual relationships and transactions. It should be no surprise, then, that
such cases often involve not only alleged violations of state and federal
consumer protection statutes, but also claims for breach of the implied
311 I d. The appellate court found that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that, in order
for it to find a breach of good faith in the absence of an express contract, it first had to find the
existence of an underlying implied contract. Id.
312Id. at 584.
313Id. at 584--85. In describing the excluder-analysis approach, the court quoted
extensively from both Comment (a) to section 205 of the Restatement and from Summers's 1968
good faith article.
314Id. at 585 (quoting Holland v. Union Oil Co., 993 P.2d lO26, lO32 (Alaska 2000)).
315 7 73 A.2d 1121 (N.J. 2001).
316Wade, 778 A.2d at 585 (citing Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1132).
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obligation of good faith and fair dealing.317 In fact, in some cases, such as the
oft-cited Best v. United States National Bank of Oregon,318 plaintiffs forego
statutory claims entirely and assert only common law claims. In the Best case,
decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1987, Lonnie and Teresa Best,
representing themselves as well as a class of bank depositors, sued the U.S.
National Bank of Oregon ("Bank") for its allegedly unlawful setting of
nonsufficient fund ("NSF") fees.319 Specifically, the Bests claimed that the
Bank's increase of its NSF fees-from three to five dollars per check over the
course of six years-was unlawful because those fees greatly exceeded the cost
for processing NSF checks. 320 The trial court class-certified three of the Bests'
claims: the Bank had breached its duty of good faith in setting the NSF fees;
the fees were unconscionable; and the fees constituted an unlawful penalty for
bank depositors' breach of contract. 321 With respect to the good faith claim, the
Bests asserted that, in setting the NSF fees so high, the Bank did not act in
good faith.322 The trial court granted summary judgment to the Bank on each of
the three claims, and while the intermediate appellate court affirmed on the
unconscionability and penalty claims, it reversed and remanded on the good
faith claim. 323
Although the depositors' account agreement contained no express
limitations on the Bank's discretionary authority to set NSF fees, the court held
that the implied obligation of good faith-which applied to the performance
and enforcement of all Oregon contracts-in effect operated to limit that very
authority.324 Furthermore, the court adopted Summers's excluder-analysis
definition of good faith, and offered theoretically and practically compelling
reasons for doing so:
The purpose of the good faith doctrine is to prohibit improper
behavior in the performance and enforcement of contracts. Because
the doctrine must be applied to the entire range of contracts,
definitions of good faith tend to be either too abstract or applicable
only to specific contexts. For this reason, Professor Summers has
argued that good faith should be conceptualized as an "excluder," by
which he means that good faith should be defined only by identifying
3l7See, e.g., In re Keach, 243 B.R. 851,855-56 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (discussing filing of
good faith bankruptcy plan proposal under § 1325 of Bankruptcy Code); In re Cannon, 230 B.R.
546,591-94 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1999) (discussing good faith transfers under § 548(c) of federal
Bankruptcy Code); Peterson v. BASF Corp., 618 N.W.2d 821, 823-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(employing "good faith" to describe unconscionable commercial conduct prohibited by New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act).
318 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987).
319Id. at 555.

320Id.
321Id.
322Id.
323 Id.
324Id.

at 556-57.
at 556.
at 557.
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various fonns of bad faith. . . . This is also the approach adopted by
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205. 325
The court, however, also sympathized with Burton's critique of the
excluder-analysis approach as being too "ad hoc and standardless," and,
therefore, not practically operationa1. 326 And while the court explicitly
acknowledged that Burton and Summers were in "substantial disagreement
with each other" on how to set forth useable good faith standards, it had no
problem adopting Burton's approach as well, in a manner consistent with
Summers's approach. 327 The court explained that both conceptualizations of
good faith aimed in the broadest sense to "effectuate the reasonable contractual
expectations of the parties.,,328 Particularly in cases involving some power
imbalance between the contracting parties-where discretionary authority has
been reserved contractually by only one party-such "reasonable contractual
expectations" require the exercising of that discretion for "particular
purposes.,,329 If the party holding the discretion exercises it for purposes "not
contemplated by the parties," that party "has perfonned in bad faith.,,33o
Here, the Bests did not argue that the Bank's discretionary setting of the
NSF fees did not confonn with their reasonable expectations under the
contract. Rather, they conflated the equitable doctrines of good faith and
unconscionability by arguing that the Bank had set the NSF fees in bad faith
because they were unconscionably high, given the relatively low cost of
processing NSF checks. 331 The court, while recognizing the overlap between
the doctrines of good faith and unconscionability, generously inferred from the
Bests' doctrinally confused argument that they had asserted a breach of good
faith c1aim.332 That is, the Bests' reasonable contractual expectation under the
depositor agreement was that the Bank would charge NSF fees in amounts
reflecting only the costs of processing NSF checks. Because the Bank had
charged NSF fees far in excess of those costs, the Bank arguably had exercised
its discretion in setting those fees for a purpose not contemplated by the
parties: maximizing the Bank's profit on the NSF checks. 333 Thus, the court
reversed the lower court and ordered it to proceed on the good faith claim. 334

325Id.
326Id.
327Id.
328Id.
329Id.
330Id.
331Id.
mId.
mId.
334Id.

(citations omitted).
at 558.

(citing Burton, supra note 7, at 391-92).
at 559.
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C. Summary: ClarifYing Common Law Good Faith Standards

Based on the foregoing discussion of exemplary cases in the categories of
arm's-length and non-arm's-length cases, one thing about common law good
faith doctrine is clear: despite the courts' common usage of certain good faith
rhetoric and their apparent reliance on both Summers's excluderanalysis/Restatement approach and/or Burton's foregone opportunities
approach, common law good faith standards remain remarkably murky. To a
certain extent, this continued state of disarray is understandable, given the ad
hoc way in which the good faith doctrine was meant to be applied.
Notwithstanding the hyper-contextual nature of the doctrine, this Part attempts
to clarify the ways in which good faith standards are articulated and applied,
based on the categories of arm's-length and power-imbalanced transactions.
First, with respect to both arm's-length commercial cases and cases
involving some degree of inequality in bargaining power between the parties,
the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires that neither of the
contracting parties perform in a such way that would deprive a counter-party of
its reasonable expectations under the contract. 335 This rhetoric of not depriving
the parties of their reasonable expectations can be found in each of the cases
discussed thus far. Deprivation of a party's reasonable expectations or "fruits"
of the contract, courts often opine, violates certain "standards of fairness," a
phrase that is found both in Summers's work on good faith and in the official
comments to section 205 of the Restatement?36 Moreover, courts often discuss
fairness in economic terms and, more specifically-as Burton would put it-as
the appropriate exercise of discretionary authority by the party who has
reserved such authority under the contract. 337 Thus, a party would deprive her
counter-party of her reasonable expectations under the contract by
opportunistically exercising its contractually reserved discretionary authority,
as in McCollum v. XCare.net, Inc. 338 and Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc. 339 In
those cases, the party attempted to terminate the counter-party's at-will
employment to deprive an employee of commissions or other compensation.
Yet, if the contract terms expressly authorize such opportunistic conduct, as in
Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc.,34o
those express terms will prevail.
335See, e.g., McCollum v. XCare.net, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(discussing breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when one party frustrates
other parties' "legitimate expectations"); Wade, 778 A.2d at 584-85 (discussing Restatement's
approach to good faith as including justified expectations of parties); Best, 739 P.2d at 558
(applying good faith doctrine to effectuate reasonable expectations of parties).
336See RESTATEMENT § 205 cmt. a; Summers, General Duty, supra note 7; Summers, Good
Faith, supra note 7.
337See Burton, supra note 7, at 378 (arguing that "party fails to perform in good faith when
it uses ... discretion to recapture foregone opportunities").
338 212 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
339815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
34°826 P.2d 710 (Cal. 1992).
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In both ann's-length and non-ann's-length cases, courts also often employ
Summers's excluder-analysis approach, adopted by the Restatement. They
define perfonnance that deprives a party of his reasonable expectation under
the contract as bad faith, one fonn of which is the opportunistic exercise of
contractually reserved discretionary authority, in the manner of Burton's
foregone opportunities model of good faith. 341 Finally, both ann's-length and
non-ann's-length cases make clear that contracting parties may not use the
implied obligation of good faith to circumvent express contractual obligations,
as demonstrated most starkly in the Carma case. 342
Interestingly, however, common law good faith doctrine begins to splinter
when courts discuss ill motive as either an element or nonelement of the breach
of good faith claim. For example, in some arm's-length cases, as in Seidenberg
v. Summit Bank,343 courts require bad motive or intention as an element of the
breach of good faith claim. Some of those cases have adopted a V.C.e.-like
approach to good faith in that they generally define ill motive as dishonesty or
noncompliance with reasonable commercial standards. 344 But in other arm'slength cases, such as Carma, courts specifically have stated that the breach of
good faith claim does not require bad motive. 345
As for non-ann's-length good faith cases, courts have consistently
required ill motive or intent as part of the breach of good faith claim, usually as
such motive relates to the improper exercise of discretionary authority reserved
to the stronger party under the contract. 346 For example, in Wilson v. Amerada
Hess Corp. /47 the plaintiffs were required to present evidence relating to the
defendant's intent to drive them out of the gas station business by employing
discriminatory pricing practices. 348 And in lost commissions cases like
McCollum v. XCare.net, Inc. ,349 courts have focused on the employer's specific
intent to avoid paying the employee compensation owed to him in the fonn of
commissions already earned, by conveniently terminating him just prior to the
commission's vesting date. 350 In at-will employment cases, courts have focused
on the employer's tendency toward opportunism in exercising its discretion to
341See Burton, supra note 7 at 380-87.
342See Carma, 826 P.2d at 728 (asserting that good faith may not be used to prohibit one
from doing that which is expressly authorized in agreement).
343 91 A.2d 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
344See supra text accompanying notes 130 and 181. However, at least one court has held
that dishonesty is not required to make a breach of good faith claim. See Carma, 826 P.2d at
727.
345See Carma, 826 P.2d at 728 (asserting that good faith may not be used to prohibit one
from doing that which is expressly authorized in agreement).
346See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
347 77 3 A.2d 1121 (N.J. 2001).
348See id. at 1131 (discussing plaintiffs need to show bad motive to demonstrate lack of
good faith).
349 21 2 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
350See id. at 1155 (discussing whether defendant's actions were conducted in bad faith to
frustrate plaintiffs expectations under compensation plan).
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terminate the employee. 351 Alternatively, in consumer cases, courts have
directed their analyses at limiting the authority reserved by the stronger party
under the contract in such a way as to broaden the scope of what kind of
conduct constitutes an abuse of that discretion and a breach of good faith.352
And finally, in many of these cases, courts, on a broader level, assessed the
alleged wrongdoer's apparent intent to commit a species of "promissory
fraud," which involves demonstrating the stronger party's intent not to
perform353 Given the more intent-specific analyses undertaken in non-ann'slength cases and the commercial reasonableness analyses applied in ann'slength cases, it follows that the cases can be read together to require more
specificity of proof in proving ill motive in non-arm's-length cases than in
arm's-length cases. On a pragmatic level, this makes sense in light of the fact
that non-arm's-length cases also tend to involve more individualistic, contextspecific contracts-with the exception of consumer contracts, which almost
always involve form or adhesion contracts.
What does this all mean in terms of the usefulness of the excluderanalysis and foregone opportunities approaches to good faith and the purported
distinction between those approaches? In terms of the purported distinction, it
means that that the excluder-analysis and foregone opportunities models of
good faith are being employed to achieve the same ends: to ensure that the
parties are performing in a way that does not deprive counter-parties of their
reasonable expectations under the contract. Summers and Burton merely
disagree on how reasonable expectations should be defined.
To Summers, reasonable expectations are potentially limitless, because of
the contextual and equitable nature of the good faith doctrine; hence, what is
reasonable to Summers is that performance which is not in bad faith. Burton
defines reasonable expectations more narrowly: to Burton, a contracting party
may reasonably expect that her counter-party will not attempt to recapture
foregone opportunities during contract performance. The foregone
opportunities model is easily subsumed as one of Summers's categories of bad
faith. Thus, when courts apply these models, the difference is not so much one
of definition, but of scope. In the end, both approaches-whether articulated in
terms of reasonable expectations, commercial reasonableness, or absence of ill
motive-are applied in order to aid in the actualization of the express tenns of
the contract and to free the contracting parties from having to negotiate over
their intent to perform. 354
Thus, the leading approaches to good faith are operationally conflatable.
But does the good faith analysis serve merely as a proxy for breach of contract
claims? At least one court-the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York-has recognized the arguably duplicative nature of the
351 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing implied covenant in at-will employment cases).
352See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing implied covenant in consumer cases).
353See Ayres & Klass, supra note 15, at 507-10.
354See id. at 511-14 (discussing examples of promissory fraud in absence of good faith).
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good faith claim: "Although New York law implies a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in every contract, a breach of that duty is merely a breach of the
underlying contract. The implied obligation is simply 'in aid and furtherance
of other terms of the agreement of the parties. ",355 Given that the obligation is
"simply in aid and furtherance of other terms of the agreement, ,,356 and in light
of the courts' consistent mandates against using good faith to contravene
express terms of the contract, this Article argues that current judicial
applications of good faith have stripped the doctrine of its equitable roots by
employing good faith rhetoric-in turn supplied by the Restatement and
Burton's foregone opportunities model-to determine whether there has been a
material breach of the contract. This is made perfectly clear in section 241 of
the Restatement, which sets forth "Circumstances Significant in Determining
Whether a Failure Is Material." Significantly, section 241 includes at
subsection (e) a good faith factor. 357 That good faith currently functions
primarily to determine whether one party has materially breached the
contract-thus entitling the nonbreaching party to suspend her own
performance under the contract-is also made clear in good faith cases, such as
those discussed supra, that do not explicitly discuss material breach. These
cases effectively analyze and determine whether there has been a breach of
contract, vis-a-vis their analyses of the breach of good faith claims, in the
absence of (violations of) express contractual terms.
To be clear, this Article does not claim that the rhetorical and analytical
functions just described are useless; to the contrary, they are quite valuable.
Nor does this Article argue that a new conceptualization of good faith should
entirely supplant the current ones. In fact, the rhetorical development of the
good faith doctrine, as well as its efficiency-driven aspects, has enabled
generations of lawyers, judges, legal scholars, law professors, and law students
to better comprehend how not to breach contracts that do not provide an
abundance of express terms. This Article does claim that, while the good faith
doctrine as it has developed in the caselaw has enormous value for purposes of
analyzing and better understanding issues of material breach, it has strayed
from its originally conceived equitable purpose, to serve some broader notion
of fairness and justice in contracting.

355Centre_Point Merch. Bank Ltd. v. Am. Express Bank Ltd., 913 F. Supp. 202, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86,
91 (N.Y. 1983»; see also Bekhor v. Josephthal Group, Inc., No. 96-CIV.-4156(LMM), 2000
WL 1521198, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13,2000) (stating in dicta that claims for breach of contract
and for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing are duplicative).
356Center-Pointe, 913 F. Supp. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted).
357REsTATEMENT § 241. Section 241 states in relevant part: "In determining whether a
failure to render or to offer performance is material, the following circumstances are significant:
... (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing." Id. § 241(e).
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Another look back to Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,358 one of the most
important good faith cases in American common law, further supports the
argument that good faith as it is presently employed functions not as an
equitable doctrine, but rather as a set of rhetorical devices relating to material
breach. As most readers will recall, Otis Wood sued Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
"a creator of fashions" whose "favor helps a sale.,,359 In his suit, Wood alleged
that Lady Duff-Gordon had breached what amounted to an exclusive
distributorship contract with him by placing her brand name on "fabrics,
dresses, and millinery without [Wood's] knowledge, and withheld the
profits.,,36o In her defense against Wood's claim, Lady Duff-Gordon argued
that there was in fact no contract between them, or that the contract with Wood
was illusory, because Wood had not expressly bound himself to anything; that
is, he had not expressly promised to use his "reasonable efforts to place [Lady
Duff-Gordon's] indorsements and market her designs.,,361 Then-Judge
Cardozo, at that time a member of New York's highest court, famously stated
that while the contract contained no express promise to use reasonable efforts
on Wood's part, "such a promise is fairly to be implied.... A promise may be
lacking, and yet the whole writing may be instinct with an obligation,
imperfectly expressed. If that is so, there is a contract.,,362
It is not so much Judge Cardozo's articulation of the content of the good
faith obligation that distinguishes it from its modern conceptualization, but
rather his reason for invoking the obligation in the first place: Judge Cardozo
employed good faith as a matter of equity, to establish the existence of a
nonillusory contract between Wood and Lady Duff-Gordon, one that included
the element of mutuality of obligation. 363 Contemporary applications of good
faith function in a different, albeit related, way: they are used to determine
whether a party has materially breached the express terms of the contract by
performing them in a particular way. In other words, generally speaking,
current applications of good faith are used to determine whether there has been
a breach of the underlying contract or one of its terms, rather than to determine
whether the contract exists at all, which is how Judge Cardozo originally
employed the doctrine. Judge Cardozo's justification for employing good faith
is more true to conceptions of implied obligations as equitable gap fillers, such
as the common law implied warranty of habitability (which has morphed into
the more specific implied warranty of quality in the sale of a new home by a

N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
at 214.

358 118

359/d.
360/d.
361/d.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
of obligation in bilateral contracts is synonymous with consideration, in that
each promise, or obligation, acts as consideration for the other. Each party must be obligated to
perform her promises--otherwise the contract will lack consideration, and so will not be valid.
362/d.

363 Mutuality
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builder-vendor)364 and the U.C.C.'s implied warranties of merchantability'65
and fitness for a particular purpose. 366
IV. CONCLUSION: RELOADING THE VESSEL

One of the goals of this Article has been to provide a nuanced
understanding of what the good faith obligation presently requires and to argue
that the good faith doctrine in its contemporary condition is a nearly empty
vessel. Courts have come to apply good faith not as a substantive implied
obligation, but as a rhetorical proxy for underlying material breach analyses.
Such contemporary applications of good faith are of great value for purposes
of deepening our understanding of the doctrines of material breach and
constructive conditions; pragmatically speaking, they greatly assist courts in
their determinations of what nonrnaterially-breaching performance of express
terms requires. Given the doctrine's great functional value, why is it still
necessary to conceive of good faith as a distinct duty, as opposed to a sub duty
related to material breach and constructive conditions?
One might respond to this question by suggesting the elimination of the
doctrine altogether, or its explicit incorporation into the doctrines of material
breach and constructive conditions. But this Article argues that such a response
would be misguided, for it would erode in a more general sense the important
"implicit dimensions,,367 of American contract law. Moreover, the doctrine of
good faith should continue to be available as a tool, in Summers's words, "to
do justice according to law.,,368
This Article proposes that the good faith doctrine may be resuscitated as
an implied obligation in two different ways: first, vis-a-vis its applicability to
bad faith conduct in contract negotiation (this is certainly not a new idea, but
one worth serious reconsideration); and, second, in the context of performance
and termination, vis-a-vis its applicability in the employment context. With
respect to the former, scholars and commentators have developed a rich body
of literature around not only whether a common law369 good faith obligation
364See Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the
Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under
One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 13, 15-21 (discussing implied warranty of quality in sale of new
homes by builder-vendor recognized in at least thirty states).
365 U .c.C. § 2-314 (2003).
366id. § 2-315.
367This phrase is borrowed explicitly from an international collection of essays. See
IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL, AND NETWORK CONTRACTS (David
Campbell et al. eds., 2003).
368 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 198.
369A requirement to negotiate in good faith is in some instances statutorily required. For
example, employers and labor unions are required to negotiate collective bargaining
requirements in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(5),
158(d) (2000) (governing unfair labor practices and requiring employer "to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees" where bargaining collectively means, in part, "the
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ought to apply to contract negotiation, but also what such an obligation should
require. 370 The obligation to negotiate in good faith is commonly referred to as
culpa in contrahendo, a tenn taken from Jhering's work on the German
jurisprudence of "faulty negotiating," which tenn was introduced into
American contract jurisprudence in 1964 by Fredrich Kessler and Edith Fine in
their famous article, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and
Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study.371 As discussed supra, Robert
Summers has advocated broadening the scope of good faith's applicability so
that it extends not only to contract performance and enforcement, but also to
the preliminary stages of fonnation and negotiation. 372 Others have taken a
more moderate position, arguing that while the obligation to negotiate in good
faith ought not apply to all contracts, it should apply to render enforceable the
controversial "agreement to agree.,,373 Fortunately for this author, these
scholars have given careful thought and functional content in their written
work to what the obligation to negotiate in good faith should require.
In my broader work on good faith, I am concerned more with how the
good faith doctrine might be reloaded with content in the contractual phases of
performance, enforcement, and termination, and in the specific context of
employment. Although good faith might be revived in a number of different
ways, I argue elsewhere that courts should use the doctrine of good faith in
contract law to prohibit improper considerations of race, gender, and sexuality
in contract perfonnance and should recognize the doctrine as a device for

performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
emplo~ment").
70 See , e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 239-43 ( 1987) (demonstrating
why "era of deals" requires good faith negotiation and offering possible content of obligation to
negotiate in good faith); Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in
Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401, 408-09
(1964) (discussing German doctrine of faulty negotiating--culpa in contrahendo--and its
expression in American common law vis-a-vis doctrines of irrevocable offers, mistake,
misrepresentation, reliance, negligence, and implied contract); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the
Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 673, 673-86 (1969) (arguing for enforceability of
"agreements to agree" and applicability of good faith obligations to such agreements); Summers,
Good Faith, supra note 7 at 220-32 (describing several categories of bad faith in contract
formation and negotiation, such as negotiation without serious intent to contract, abusing
privilege to withdraw proposal or offer, entering deal without intention to perform or with intent
to recklessly disregard prospective inability to perform, seller's nondisclosure of known defects
in goods, and taking advantage of another in driving bargain); John Spencer, Note, A Call for a
Common Law Culpa in Contrahendo Counterpart, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 587,604-14 (1980-1981)
(arguing that common law good faith obligation ought to apply to contract negotiation, in light
of existing inadequacies in remedies for injuries suffered by those falling victim to faulty
negotiation).
371See Kessler & Fine, supra note 370, at 401.
372 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 220-32.
373 See Farnsworth, supra note 370, at 269-84; Knapp, supra note 370, at 721-23.
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eliminating racial and sexual subordination that can function beyond the scope
of conventional civil rights jurisprudence. 374
The use of good faith in this way raises many important and difficult
questions: How does one justify incorporating public law norms against
discrimination into the quintessentially private domain of contract law? What
would such a model of good faith require of contracting parties? Why is such a
good faith application necessary?375 But such use explicitly attempts to reload
the nearly empty vessel of good faith with one important call in mind: "to do
justice according to law.,,376 As such, this Article comprises an important
doctrinal leg of a larger project whose more theoretical and normative goal is
to reconceive and reinvigorate the private law doctrine of good faith as one that
might assist in effecting a p1.lblic law norm of equality.

374See Houh, supra note 8, at 1095-96.
375For a lengthy discussion of these questions, among others, see Emily M.S. Houh,
Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of
Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005); see also Houh, supra note
8, at 1066-89 (discussing equality and discrimination in cases analyzing and applying good faith
doctrine in at-will employment context).
376See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 7, at 198.
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